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INTRODUCTION 
On February 23, 1997, it seemed that the world paused, if only 
for a moment, to reflect upon the future of the human species.  The 
announcement by Scottish scientists, Ian Wilmut and Keith 
Campbell, that they had orchestrated the birth of Dolly the sheep, 
the world’s first cloned mammal, ignited a worldwide debate about 
the glory and tragedy of science.1  For many, Dolly was a shocking 
symbol of biotechnology raging out of control, warranting a swift and 
decisive halting of any further experimentation in the cloning arena 
before its inevitable spillover to the human race.  For a smaller group, 
Dolly was a marvelous and long-awaited sign that a century-old 
inquiry into the possibility of asexual reproduction had yielded a 
tentative answer.  For both groups, and for the myriad whose views 
fall somewhere in between, the past six years have supplied sufficient 
fuel to ensure that the cloning fires will burn long into the future. 
In the six years since the announcement of Dolly’s birth, we have 
undertaken to grasp some of the scientific methods associated with 
cloning.  Importantly, many now understand that cloning is not a 
single technique, but rather refers to ways in which the genome of an 
organism can be replicated.2  According to the American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine, the following three techniques  are currently 
referred to as cloning: 1) reproductive cloning; 2) therapeutic 
cloning; and 3) embryonic cloning.3  Each of these techniques 
involves numerous scientific steps and raises both unique and 
overlapping concerns.  A brief description of each type of cloning is 
warranted. 
Reproductive cloning involves somatic cell nuclear transfer 
(SCNT).4  Using SCNT, the nucleus is removed from an unfertilized 
oocyte and replaced by the nucleus of a somatic (non-sex) cell of the 
organism to be cloned.5  An electrical pulse is then applied to the 
oocyte to activate it, much the way a sperm activates an egg by 
 
 1 See Ian Wilmut et al., Viable Offspring Derived from Fetal and Adult Mammalian 
Cells, 385 NATURE 810 (1997).  On February 14, 2003, nearly six years to the date of 
their groundbreaking birth announcement, scientists at the Roslin Institute 
announced that Dolly had died.  Reports reveal that she was euthanized after 
veterinary examinations showed she had a progressive lung disease.  See Dolly the First 
Cloned Animal Destroyed At Scots Institute, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Feb. 14, 2003. 
 2 See Michael R. Soules, The President’s Message: Cloning, 35:1 ASRM NEWS 3 
(2001). 
 3 Michael R. Soules, The President’s Message: Cloning, 35:1 ASRM NEWS 3 (2001). 
 4 See George E. Seidel, Jr., Cloning Mammals: Methods, Applications, and 
Characteristics of Cloned Animals, in Human Cloning 28-31 (Barbara MacKinnon ed., 
2000). 
 5 Id. 
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penetrating its surface in the course of natural fertilization.  
Thereafter, the oocyte develops into an embryo that can be 
implanted into the uterus of a gestational carrier.6  A developing 
embryo is generally transplanted back to the uterus when it reaches 
the four-to-eight cell stage, which is approximately two days after 
fertilization.7  Reproductive cloning differs from natural, or sexual, 
reproduction in that the offspring have the identical genome as the 
cell donor, rather than a mixture of two genomes from the male and 
female gamete providers.  Dolly is the product of reproductive 
cloning. 
Therapeutic cloning begins with the same steps as SCNT but 
stops short of implanting the derived embryo into a gestational 
carrier.8  Instead, the embryo is grown to the blastocyst stage, which is 
beyond the point where it would be implanted into the uterus.9  A 
blastocyst is an embryo at about six days of development.10  It is 
composed of an inner cell mass and a trophectoderm, which is an 
outer layer of cells destined to become part of the placenta.11  The 
cells from the inner cell mass have the potential to form any cell type 
of the body and are commonly referred to as embryonic stem cells.12  
Therapeutic cloning involves removing cells from the intercellular 
mass and developing compatible stem cells for the organism that 
provided the nucleus.13  A potential application of therapeutic 
cloning may be the development of tissue for transplantation.  If 
embryonic stem cells can be made to differentiate into liver, nerve, 
pancreas, or other human cells, such tissue would likely not be 
rejected by the immune system of the person who supplied the 
nuclear DNA.14  Therapeutic cloning may hold the promise of 
treating many life-threatening diseases and injuries, but it remains 
controversial because it requires the destruction of a human embryo. 
Embryonic cloning begins with an embryo formed in the 
“traditional” way, that is by a single sperm penetrating a single oocyte.  
 
 6 See Seidel, supra note 4, at 28-31 (Barbara MacKinnon ed., 2000). 
 7 See R. R. Saith & I. L. Sargent, Embryo Selection for Transfer in Human In Vitro 
Fertilization, 5 ASSIST. REP. REV. 145 (1995).  Presumably an embryo created through 
cloning would likewise be transferred to the uterus at the same early stage of 
development. 
 8 James A. Thomson, Human Embryonic Stem Cells, in THE HUMAN EMBRYONIC 
STEM CELL DEBATE 15-16 (Suzanne Holland et al. eds., 2001). 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. at 17. 
 13 Soules, supra note 2, at 3. 
 14 Seidel, supra note 4, at 33-35. 
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The cells or blastomeres of the early embryo are then separated and 
the nucleus from each of these blastomeres is placed in an 
enucleated oocyte which then becomes an embryo.15  Embryo cloning 
thus produces a finite number of identical offspring, each having the 
same genome as the original embryo.16  Unlike reproductive or 
therapeutic cloning, embryonic cloning does not involve replicating 
an existing organism, but rather creates multiple offspring from the 
donors’ combined DNA.  Embryo cloning can be used, for example, 
if a couple has limited gametes and wants to maximize their chance 
for a successful pregnancy by creating multiple embryos. 
Each form of cloning has evoked spirited and often negative 
reaction.  Opponents of reproductive cloning warn of “playing God,” 
threatening the individuality of the cloned person, depriving a 
cloned child the right to an open future, advancing eugenics by 
creating super- and sub-human beings, and eroding family relations 
by creating chaos in the natural ordering of generations.17  
Therapeutic cloning, like the ongoing debate over the use of human 
embryonic stem cells for research purposes, invites discussion about 
the intentional destruction of human embryos.  Many feel it is simply 
wrong to create an embryo for the purpose of destroying it, even if 
such destruction could produce a good in the form of a cure for 
disease.  Finally, embryo cloning may be viewed as an unnatural and 
unnecessary manipulation of the human embryo, an intervention 
that shows disrespect for the integrity of this early form of human life. 
In the course of public debate, the differences between the 
various types of cloning seem to fade; what appears instead are 
generalized reactions to the concept of cloning as it is popularly 
understood, primarily as a means of reproduction.18  The initial and 
 
 15 Id. at 24-28. 
 16 Id. at 24-27. 
 17 See Bonnie Steinbock, Cloning Human Beings: Sorting Through the Ethical Issues, in 
HUMAN CLONING, supra note 4, at 68-84 (containing a review and refutation of the 
major ethical arguments that have been made against human reproductive cloning); 
see also Lori B. Andrews, Is There A Right to Clone?  Constitutional Challenges to Bans on 
Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L & TECH. 643, 649-57 (1998) (setting out the potential 
physical risks, and the psychological and societal impact of cloning humans). 
 18 Perhaps this is best demonstrated by the passage of H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. ( 
2001), which bans all forms of cloning.  Specifically, the bill provides that “[i]t shall 
be unlawful for any person or entity, public or private, in or affecting interstate 
commerce, knowingly (1) to perform or attempt to perform human cloning . . . .”  
H.R. 2505, at § 302(a).  The bill later prohibits the development of human embryos 
through cloning, thus effectively banning therapeutic cloning.  Id. at § 302(d).  At 
the time of the House debate, the concept of therapeutic cloning was only beginning 
to garner public attention.  Today it is a more visible issue, due in part to President 
Bush’s announcement in August 2001 about the use of federal funds for human 
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continued reaction to reproductive cloning is generally negative, as 
evidenced by the existing and contemplated bans on the scientific 
process.19  To date, seven states have enacted reproductive cloning 
bans,20 while similar legislation is pending in a majority of American 
states.21  Cloning continues to dominate the national political scene as 
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives wrestle over 
the future of reproduction and recuperation using this emerging, yet 
unnerving, technology.  The only consensus our national leaders 
seem to have reached is that while the merits of therapeutic cloning 
remain debatable, the practice of reproductive cloning is morally and 
scientifically unacceptable and should be prohibited.22 
This Article addresses the worthiness of a ban on human cloning 
and focuses specifically on the following question: Is a ban on human 
reproductive cloning moral, legal, or practical?  Part I explores the 
initial and continuing public and political reactions to the concept of 
cloning as a means of producing children.  Because these reactions 
continue to dominate our emerging legal response to cloning, a 
review of public sentiment is an integral element in an analysis of 
cloning law.  Interestingly, if one tracks the opinions of public policy 
makers, as well as members of the general public, it appears that little 
has changed since Dolly’s birth in February 1997 when the possibility 
of cloning moved closer to a reality—cloning remains a highly 
unpopular prospect, thus driving the move toward state, national, 
and international bans23 of the practice.  Part I posits that cloning 
resembles other reproductive technologies whose introduction 
sparked tremendous fear, but whose usefulness ultimately quelled the 
trepidation accompanying them. 
Next, Part II queries whether there is any moral, legal, or 
practical justification for a ban on cloning.  Part II.A. analyzes the 
 
embryonic stem cell research, a technique similar to therapeutic cloning.  See, e.g., 
Carol M. Ostrom, Stem-Cell Research Shows Promise, But Techniques Intertwine with 
Cloning, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 29, 2001. 
 19 See infra notes 31-34. 
 20 See infra notes 192-98. 
 21 See infra note 41. 
 22 See, e.g., Helen Dewar, Human Cloning Ban Sidetracked; Senate Vote Deals 
Amendment Second Setback in a Week, WASH. POST, June 19, 2002, at A4 (reporting 
remarks of Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle that a bill to allow cloning for 
research while banning it to produce babies has the support of a majority of 
senators). 
 23 See infra notes 41 & 191-97.  An international Convention of the Preservation of 
the Human Species that would outlaw all efforts to initiate a pregnancy by using 
human cloning is suggested in George J. Annas et al., Protecting the Endangered 
Human: Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations, 28 
AM. J.L. & MED. 151 (2002). 
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moral justifications for cloning bans under two well-established 
branches of moral philosophy: utilitarianism and deontology.  Using 
the framework of these often conflicting approaches, Part II.A. also 
explores the rightness and wrongness of human cloning and its 
prohibition.  Ultimately, both philosophies reasonably yield the 
conclusion that a ban on human cloning cannot be morally justified.  
If cloning proves to be a safe and effective method of human 
reproduction, a utilitarian calculus would favor the balance of 
benefits that cloning could achieve, while a deontologist may find a 
moral obligation to advance our understanding of the creation of 
human life. 
Part II.B. looks at the legal justifications for cloning bans and 
specifically raises two potential constitutional challenges to such bans.  
First, this Part focuses on the assertion that human cloning bans 
violate protected procreational autonomy by denying individuals the 
right to choose this unique method of reproduction.  Assuming 
human cloning proves to be a safe and effective technique, it would 
be considered a viable form of reproduction.  Any governmental 
prohibition on the use of cloning technologies, therefore, would be a 
substantial infringement of a protected constitutional right.  
Moreover, Part II.B. argues that current cloning bans are 
unconstitutionally vague and thus violate the due process rights of 
patients, scientists, and researchers alike. 
Finally, Part II.C. considers the practical aspects of banning 
human cloning.  Advances in animal cloning research already 
portend the inevitable spillover to the human population, a spillover 
that is only fueled by the companion interest in developing profitable 
therapeutics using cloned embryonic stem cells.  In addition, 
ongoing efforts to clone the first human being are well-documented 
and proceed despite overwhelming opposition to reproduction 
through cloning.  Thus, current scientific advances in cloning let the 
“genie out of the bottle” and, practically speaking, no law will abate 
the modern world’s interest in the cloning phenomenon.  
Acknowledging this reality, we must turn our attention away from 
whether cloning bans are justifiable and focus instead on what effect 
cloning will have on our society.  The search for answers may also 
help us understand whether we should view cloning as an 
incremental step in a continuum of assisted reproductive advances or 
a transgression of nature that will doom the human species. 
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I.  GAGING THE RESPONSE TO HUMAN CLONING 
A.  Initial Reactions and Actions 
In the days and months following the announcement of Dolly’s 
birth, the federal government acted with uncharacteristic speed to 
assure the public that human cloning would not become a reality in 
the near future.  On March 4, 1997, a mere ten days after Dr. Wilmut 
made worldwide headlines, President Clinton issued an Executive 
Order banning the use of federal funding for human cloning 
research.24  At the same time, the President asked his previously 
assembled bioethics council, the National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission (NBAC), to review the legal and ethical issues associated 
with cloning and to report back to him in ninety days with 
recommendations on possible federal actions to prevent its abuse.25  
In June 1997, the NBAC responded to the President’s request and 
issued a report recommending a temporary moratorium on all 
clinical and research efforts to clone a human being.26 
The NBAC Report is, by its own admission, a compromise 
position grounded in the issue of safety,  the only area of common 
agreement among the diverse group of participants.  The NBAC 
agreed that cloning is “not safe to use on humans at this time,” and 
therefore is “likely to involve unacceptable risks to the fetus and/or 
potential child.”27  This consensus on safety, coupled with the public’s 
perceived clamoring for protection from science gone awry, would 
have seemed sufficient to mobilize Congress into passing a total ban 
on human cloning.  In fact, to date no such ban has passed both 
Houses of Congress, despite the introduction of numerous bills.28  
 
 24 Memorandum on the Prohibition on Federal Funding for Cloning of Human 
Beings, 33 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 281 (Mar. 4, 1997).  At the same time, President 
Clinton urged the American scientific community to voluntarily refrain from 
pursuing research in human cloning, at least until such time as a federal advisory 
commission could study the issue.  Id. 
 25 Letter from William J. Clinton, President of the United States, to Harold 
Shapiro, Chair, National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Feb. 24, 1997, reprinted in 
Cloning Human Beings: Report and Recommendations of the National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission (1997) (hereinafter NBAC Report). 
 26 NBAC Report, supra note 25, at iii-iv (Executive Summary).  NBAC also 
recommended a “continuation of the current moratorium on the use of federal 
funding in support of any attempt to create a child by somatic cell nuclear transfer.”  
Id. at iii. 
 27 Id. at 108. 
 28 See, e.g., H.R. 923, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 1611, 105TH Cong. (1998); S. 1602, 
105th Cong. (1998); S. 1599, 105th Cong. (1998).  On July 31, 2001 H.R. 2505 passed 
the House by a vote of 265-162.  The bill, and other anti-cloning measures, are 
currently being considered by the Senate.  See infra note 40. For a discussion of 
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One might surmise that some legislators worried as early as 1997 that 
a total ban would also halt valuable research using therapeutic 
cloning, or that a ban on reproductive cloning could be interpreted 
as an infringement on women’s reproductive autonomy.  Perhaps the 
lack of action is simply the product of ordinary political gridlock.29 
State legislatures proved far more anxious to outlaw human 
cloning, as several states enacted cloning bans in the aftermath of 
Dolly’s birth.30  California became the first state to ban human 
cloning by statute, placing a “five-year moratorium on the cloning of 
an entire human being in order to evaluate the profound medical, 
ethical, and social implications that such a possibility raises.”31  The 
California moratorium was originally set to expire on January 1, 2003, 
but a new law was enacted in September 2002, instituting a 
permanent ban on human cloning for reproductive purposes.32  In 
addition to legislative action in the United States, numerous other 
countries enacted cloning bans, including twenty European nations.33 
The many efforts to ban the technique of human cloning were 
not surprising given the intense and nearly universal condemnation 
of the prospect of human somatic cell nuclear transfer.  In a February 
24, 1997 Gallup Poll, just one day after Dr. Wilmut’s stunning 
announcement, adults in the United States were asked, “Do you think 
that human cloning is a good thing or a bad thing?”  The results were 
overwhelming.  Eighty-eight percent said cloning was a bad thing, 
with only six percent finding it a good thing.  Similar results were 
 
legislative efforts to ban human cloning, see Elizabeth Price Foley, The Constitutional 
Implications of Human Cloning, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 649 (2000). 
 29 The reasons for congressional inaction on human cloning are far clearer today 
than they were in the early stages of the debate.  In the past year alone, awareness of 
the use and promise of therapeutic cloning has grown dramatically, due in part to 
President Bush’s August 2001 announcement on federal funding for stem cell 
research, a related technique that harvests cells from an early embryo.  See supra 
notes 8-14 and accompanying text.  By all accounts, the Senate has failed to pass 
cloning legislation because its members are divided over whether to ban all forms of 
cloning, or to allow therapeutic cloning but prohibit cloning to produce children.  
See Dewar, supra note 22, at A4. 
 30 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24185 (Deering 1997); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 40:1299.36.3 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-16.4-2 (1998); S. 864, 89th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1997). 
 31 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24185(1) (Deering 1997). 
 32 See S. 1230, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001) (California Senate bill extending the 
operation of the anti-cloning legislation indefinitely, signed into law by Governor 
Davis on September 22, 2002). 
 33 See Foley, supra note 28, at 649 n.20 (stating  that “Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Greece, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldovia, Norway, Portugal, 
Romania, San Marino, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey have banned human 
closing”). 
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obtained when the question was framed in terms of morality.  The 
numbers were identical in response to the question, “Do you think 
that human cloning would be morally acceptable or would it be 
morally wrong?”  A full eighty-eight percent said cloning would be 
morally wrong, and only six percent answered that it would be 
morally acceptable.34 
Clearly, the initial reactions to the prospect of human cloning 
were overwhelmingly negative.  Editorial pages across the world were 
replete with dire predictions should the technique make its way into 
human reproductive circles.35  Even Dr. Wilmut, the Scottish scientist 
who had produced Dolly, labeled the possibility of human cloning 
“ethically unacceptable,”36 though he confessed that there was “no 
reason in principle why you couldn’t do it.”37  With such a 
tremendous consensus on the evils of human cloning, it seemed 
likely that worldwide efforts to thwart its development would be swift 
and decisive.  But, as in many other arenas, accord does not 
necessarily translate into action.  Though initial reactions were 
emotional and emboldening, political developments affecting 
cloning have been fairly sparse, perhaps due in part to the lack of any 
significant breakthroughs in the field of human cloning.  As the 
twenty-first century dawned, however, the sleeping giant—cloning—
began to wake. 
B.  Recent Attitudes Toward Human Cloning 
In the six years since Dolly’s birth, opposition to human cloning 
has remained the same.  In a November 2001 Gallup Poll, once again 
eighty-eight percent  of respondents said they oppose “cloning that is 
designed specifically to result in the birth of a human being,” while 
only nine percent approved of such activity.38  Congress continues to 
debate the cloning issue, buoyed by passage of two House Measures 
on July 31, 2001 and February 27, 2003, banning all varieties of 
 
 34 Roper Center at University of Connecticut, Public Opinion Online (February 
24, 1997). 
 35 See, e.g., James D. Davis, Cloning News Raises Words of Caution, SUN-SENTINEL, 
Feb. 27, 1997, at A1; Philip Terzian, Send in the Clones, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Feb. 26, 
1997, at B7; Nigel Hawkes, Legal Barriers Will Prevent Apocalypse Now, If Not Later, THE 
TIMES, Feb. 26, 1997; Cloning for Good or Evil, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1997, at A26; Carol 
McGraw & Susan Kelleher, Can Cloning Also Give Life to a Soul?, ORANGE COUNT. REG., 
Feb. 25, 1997, at A1; Richard Saltus, Created Genetically Equal; Cloning of Adult Mammal 
Breaks the Scientific Mold, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 24, 1997, at A1. 
 36 See Wilmut et al., supra note 1. 
 37 See Daniel Callahan, A Step Too Far, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1997, at A23. 
 38 Reported by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, No. 
2., vol. 13., at 60 (Mar. 1, 2002). 
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human cloning, including reproductive and therapeutic forms.39  
Several bills are currently pending in the Senate, each seeking to ban 
reproductive cloning, but differing on an additional ban on 
therapeutic cloning.40  At the state level, a majority of jurisdictions are 
currently considering anti-cloning measures,41 and seven states have 
 
 39 H.R. 2505, 107th Cong., (2001) passed the House of Representatives by a vote 
of 265-162.  The House bill imposes criminal penalties on any person or entity that 
performs or attempts to perform human cloning.  The bill defines human cloning as 
“human asexual reproduction, accomplished by introducing nuclear material from 
one of more human somatic cells into a fertilized or unfertilized oocyte whose 
nuclear material has been removed or inactivated so as to produce a living organism 
(at any stage of development) that is genetically virtually identical to an existing or 
previously existing human organism.”  H.R. 2505, at § 301(1).  The reference to a 
ban on producing “a living organism at any stage of development” would apply to 
research or therapeutic cloning which involves producing an early stage embryo 
from which stem cells are derived.  H.R. 534, 108th Cong. (2003), passed the House 
of Representatives by a vote of 241-155.  It likewise criminalizes human cloning. 
 40 See S. 2439, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 2076, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 1899, 107th 
Cong. (2002); S. 1893, 107th Cong. (2002).  In addition to the bills pending in the 
Senate, several bills were introduced over several years in the House of 
Representatives.  See, e.g., H.R. 3495, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 1758, 107th Cong. 
(2001); H.R. 214, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2608, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2505, 
107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2172, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 790, 107th Cong. (2001); 
H.R. 1608, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 1644, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 704, 107th Cong. 
(2001); S. 1372, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 1260, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 2326, 106th 
Cong. (1999); S. 571, 106th Cong. (1999). 
 41 See H.R. 218, 2002 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2002); H.R. 2108, 45th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. 
(Ariz. 2002); Jt. Res. 38, 2001-01 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002); S. 1557, 2001-02 Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 2002); S. 1230, 2001-02 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002); H.R. 1073, 63rd Gen. Assemb., 
2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2002); S. 344, 141st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Yr. (Del. 2002); S. 329, 
141st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Yr. (Del. 2002); S. 1164, 104th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2002); H.R. 
805, 104th Reg. Sess. (Fla., 2002); H.R. Res. 1612, 146th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Ga. 2002); S. Res. 864, 146th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2002); H.R. 3693, 92nd 
Gen. Assemb., 2001-02 Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2001); S. 493, 92nd Gen. Assemb., 2001-02 
Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2002); S. 138, 112th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2001); S. 
2118, 79th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Sess. (Iowa 2002); H.R. 2736, 79th Legis., 2002 Reg. 
Sess. (Kan. 2002); H.R. 138, 2002 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2002); H.R. Res. 458, 2002 Reg. 
Sess. (Ky. 2001); S. 1809, 182nd Gen. Ct., 2001 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2001); S. 1794, 
182nd Gen. Ct., 2001 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2001); S. 1673, 182nd Gen. Ct., 2001 Reg. 
Sess. (Mass. 2000); S. 192, 182nd Gen. Ct., 2001 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2000); H.R. 354, 
91st  Legis., 2002 Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2002); H.R. 361, 2002 Reg. Sess. of Miss. Legis. 
(Miss. 2001); H.R. 1449, 91st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2002); H.R. 1028, 
91st Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2001); H.R. 947, 91st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. 
Sess. (Mo. 2001); H.R. 718, 91st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2001); H.R. 1067, 
97th Legis., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2002); H.R. 1464, 2nd Year of the 157th Sess. of the 
Gen. Ct. (N.H. 2002); H.R. 2040, 210th Legis. (N.J. 2002); H.R. 1379, 209th Legis., 
2nd Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2002); S. 542, 209th Legis., 2nd Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2002); H.R. 3978, 
209th Legis., 2nd Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2001); S. 7638, 225th Annual Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 
2002); H.R. 9292, 224th Annual Legis. Sess (N.Y. 2001); H.R. 2905, 224th Annual 
Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2001); S. 1689, 224th Annual Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2001); S. 1161, 
224th Annual Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2001); S. 670, 224th Annual Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2001); 
S. 1552, 48th Legis. 2nd Sess. (Okla. 2002); H.R. 2036, 48th Legis, 2nd Sess. (Okla. 
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already enacted legislation banning human reproductive cloning.42 
Numerous blue-ribbon panels and professional organizations 
have reported on cloning in recent years; these reports illustrate 
general opposition to cloning, particularly reproductive cloning.  
Prominent among these panels is the National Academy of Sciences 
(NAS), which issued a tentative report in April 2002 addressing the 
scientific and medical aspects of human reproductive cloning.43  In its 
report, NAS recommends that “human reproductive cloning should 
not now be practiced [because] [i]t is dangerous and likely to fail.”44  
The report further recommends that there be a legally enforceable 
ban on the practice of human reproductive cloning.45  The NAS 
position is somewhat akin to that taken by President Clinton’s 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission in suggesting that any ban 
be reconsidered within five years.46  Reconsideration, NAS argues, 
should be based on new scientific and medical evidence 
demonstrating that the cloning procedure is “likely to be safe and 
effective” and “a broad national dialogue on the societal, religious, 
and ethical issues suggests that a reconsideration of the ban is 
warranted.”47 
Professional organizations have also responded hesitantly, and 
sometimes negatively, to cloning.  One professional organization that 
might be viewed as friendly to human cloning is the American Society 
 
15, 2002); H.R. 2142, 48th Legis., 2nd Sess. (Okla. 2002); H.R. 2011, 48th Legis., 2nd 
Sess. (Okla. 2002); H.R. 3897, 71st Legis. Assemb. (Or. 2001); H.R. 7145, 2001-02 
Legis. Sess. (R.I. 2002); S. 820, 114th Sess. of the S.C. Gen. Assemb. (S.C. 2001); H.R. 
4408, 114th Sess. of the S.C. Gen. Assembly (S.C. 2001); S. Con. Res. 13, 77th Legis. 
Assembly (S.C. 2002); S. 1209, 77th Legis. (Tex. 2001); S. 102, 77th Legis. (Tex. 
2000); H.R. 2463, 2001 Sess. (Va. 2001); S. 1305, 2001 Sess. (Va. 2001); S. 379, 95th 
Legis. Sess. (Wis. 2002); H.R. 699, 95th Legis. Sess. (Wis. 2002). 
 42 See infra notes 192-97. 
 43 COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND PUBLIC POLICY, POLICY AND GLOBAL 
AFFAIRS DIVISION, NAT. ACAD. OF SCIENCES, SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL ASPECTS OF HUMAN 
REPRODUCTIVE CLONING 6-6 (National Academy Press 2002) (unedited manuscript on 
file with author) [hereinafter SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL ASPECTS OF HUMAN 
REPRODUCTIVE CLONING]. 
 44 Id. 
 45 The NAS panel also considered the scientific and medical aspects of 
therapeutic cloning and concluded that “biomedical research using nuclear 
transplantation to produce stem cells be permitted.”  Thus, the panel approved 
moving forward with therapeutic cloning efforts while supporting a total ban on 
reproductive cloning, at least until the safety of the technique could be established.  
Id. at 6-6 - 6-7. 
 46 PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY: AN 
ETHICAL INQUIRY, Executive Summary (July 2002) [hereinafter HCHD REPORT] 
(calling for a four year moratorium on human cloning). 
 47 SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL ASPECTS OF HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE CLONING, supra note 
43, at 6-6. 
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for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), a voluntary organization of 
fertility specialists founded in 1944.  ASRM is a multidisciplinary 
organization whose members include physicians and other health 
care professionals practicing in the area of reproductive medicine.48  
Because many of its members could benefit professionally and 
financially by offering cloning services, one might assume that ASRM 
would favor minimal restrictions on the technique.  Yet, in a 
November 2000 report from its Ethics Committee, ASRM joined the 
swell of anti-cloning sentiment.49  After discussing the possible ethical 
arguments for and against reproductive cloning, the ASRM Ethics 
Committee concluded that “[a]s long as the safety of reproductive 
SCNT is uncertain, ethical issues have been insufficiently explored, 
and infertile couples have alternatives for conception, the use of 
reproductive SCNT by medical professionals does not meet standards 
of ethical acceptability.”50  Thus, opposition to cloning continues to 
predominate even among physicians and researchers who are most 
knowledgeable about the science and potential benefits of this 
emerging reproductive technology. 
The most recent governmental condemnation of human cloning 
can be found in the newly released report by the President’s Council 
on Bioethics (“the Council”).  Created by Executive Order on 
November 28, 2001,51 the Council was charged with advising the 
President on bioethical issues that “may emerge as a consequence of 
advances in biomedical science and technology.”52  The Council 
chose human cloning as its first topic of inquiry, explaining that 
“[t]he ethics of human cloning has been the subject of intense 
discussion in the United States and throughout the world for more 
than five years, and it remains the subject of heated debate in 
Congress.”53  In July 2002, the Council issued a first report entitled 
Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry.54  The report 
identifies five categories of concern regarding reproductive cloning 
and ultimately concludes that “cloning-to-produce-children is not 
only unsafe but also morally unacceptable, and ought not to be 
 
 48 Information about ASRM can be found at its website, http://www.asrm.org 
(last visited July 18, 2002). 
 49 The Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, 
Human Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer (Cloning), in 74 FERTILITY & STERILITY 873, 875 
(2000). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Exec. Order No. 13237, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,851 (Nov. 28, 2001). 
 52 Id. at § 2(a). 
 53 HCHD REPORT, supra note 46, at Preface. 
 54 See id. 
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attempted.”55  The Council’s view on human reproductive cloning was 
reported as unanimous, in contrast with its views on therapeutic 
cloning, with some members favoring regulation and others calling 
for a four-year moratorium on cloning for biomedical research.56 
What is interesting about these and other measures of public 
opinion is that we are responding to the prospect of human cloning, 
not to any existing use of the technology.  The adage that “fear of the 
unknown may be worse than the reality” has certainly dominated the 
cloning debate.  Many commentators look to animal cloning 
experiments and warn of potential safety concerns that could appear 
in human attempts, while others conjure up worst case scenarios, 
portending a “horde of Hitlers” populating our soil and wreaking 
havoc on our civilized world.57  In every case, opinions about cloning 
rest purely on how one views the future, a mortal impossibility by all 
known accounts.  Whatever the future of human cloning holds, it is 
still in the future.  The emergence of cloning as a new reproductive 
technology marks a change from past introductions of newly 
developed reproductive techniques.  In past years, we were 
introduced to new assisted reproductive technologies such as artificial 
insemination and in vitro fertilization from reports of their success in 
humans.  No media frenzy accompanied the early trials to study and 
perfect these new methods of conception.58  When the technologies 
were introduced, public reaction was initially negative, as it now is 
with cloning, but grew increasingly positive as the safety and 
effectiveness of the new technologies became apparent.59  Learning of 
a technology’s promise before hearing of its prospect can have a 
profound effect on the public’s perception of that technology.  With 
cloning, we have had a glimpse of the future and we do not like what 
we see.  Our current efforts to ban future cloning may be grounded 
in our sincere desire to save the species from certain doom, but we 
 
 55 Id. at 6 (Executive Summary).  The five categories of concern are: 1) problems 
of identity and individuality; 2) concerns regarding manufacture; 3) the prospect of 
a new eugenics; 4) troubled family relations; and 5) effects on society.  Id. at 6-7. 
 56 Id. at 11-13; see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush’s Bioethics Advisory Panel 
Recommends a Moratorium, Not a Ban, On Cloning Research, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2002, at 
A21. 
 57 See Judith F. Daar, The Future of Human Cloning: Prescient Lessons from Medical 
Ethics Past, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 167, 168 n.7 (1998). 
 58 The early trials of human in vitro fertilization did garner some comment, but 
by all objective standards did not rise to the level of public awareness surrounding 
cloning.  See, e.g., Leon R. Kass, Babies by Means of In Vitro Fertilization: Unethical 
Experiments on the Unborn?, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1174 (1971). 
 59 See Daar, supra note 57, at 169-79 (describing the early public reactions to 
artificial insemination by donor and in vitro fertilization). 
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must look carefully at whether our efforts can be justified. 
II.  CAN A BAN ON HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE CLONING BE JUSTIFIED? 
Opposition to human cloning is grounded in many rationales.  
The most widely held, and perhaps the only legitimate reason for 
banning cloning, centers on concerns about safety and efficacy.  
Dolly’s birth was widely reported to be the result of 277 failed 
attempts,60 and animal studies continue to reveal pregnancy and 
neonatal loss, as well as significant structural and functional ailments 
among those animals who do survive birth.61  Though safety concerns 
are speculative at this point because no attempts at human 
reproductive cloning have been verified,62 these concerns do loom 
large as we near the brink of  the cloning barrier.  Virtually all other 
objections, be they moral, religious, social, or otherwise, seem to 
contain the same core argument: that human cloning will change the 
so-called natural order of life, for the worse.63  What follows is a 
discussion of the three primary bases underlying a potential ban on 
cloning.  All pose a simple question: Can a ban on cloning be 
justified on moral, legal, or practical grounds? 
A.  Is a Ban on Human Cloning Moral? 
The foray into questions of morality is fraught with controversy 
 
 60 See Wilmut et al., supra note 1, at 811. 
 61 See infra notes 232-38 and accompanying text. 
 62 On April 8, 2002, it was reported that Italian fertility specialist Severino 
Antinori had succeeded in the first stages of human reproductive cloning.  He 
allegedly told reporters at a conference in the United Arab Emirates that a woman in 
his research study was, at that time, eight weeks pregnant with a cloned embryo.  See 
First Human Clone ‘Is An Arab’, DAILY MAIL, Apr. 8, 2002, at 17.  As of February 14, 
2003, a group known as Clonaid has claimed to have cloned at least three babies 
born somewhere outside the United States.  The first child, a girl named Eve, was 
claimed to have been born on December 26, 2002, to American parents.  Two other 
cloned babies were allegedly born to parents from Japan and the Netherlands.  See 
Amid Growing Scrutiny, Clonaid Says Third Cloned Baby Has Been Born, GENOMICS & 
GENETICS WKLY., Feb. 14, 2003, at A16. 
 63 Examples of these arguments include fear that cloning will undermine human 
individuality and dignity, encourage parents to treat their children as commodities 
rather than as human beings, and destroy the integrity of families.  See Steinbock, 
supra note 17, at 68-84.  Steinbock summarizes additional moral, ethical and social 
concerns over cloning including the temptation to play God, the harm of depriving a 
child of the right to an open future, the nefarious desire to create a sub-human 
species to serve those of ordinary conception, the fear of eugenics, the deleterious 
effect on family relations when a parent is both father/mother and sibling, and the 
deprivation of having two genetic parents.  Id.  Of course, these arguments against 
cloning implicitly assume that none of these harms exist under circumstances of 
ordinary conception, a claim that can hardly be substantiated. 
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even when the inquiries are simple and straightforward.  The 
morality of human cloning is, of course, hardly a simple matter.  The 
question of whether human reproductive cloning should be banned 
has evoked tremendous conflicts among lawmakers, scientists, and 
perhaps even individual families.  Whether a ban on human cloning 
is morally right or wrong is a seemingly simple query, but one that 
evades an easy answer.  The search for guidance on questions of 
morality often leads to the realm of moral philosophy.  Through the 
thoughtfulness and eloquence of great thinkers of the past and 
present, we can begin to formulate a more systematic approach to 
determining the morality of a cloning ban. 
As an initial inquiry, we must answer the question: what is moral 
philosophy?  Two authors who contemplated this question responded 
that modern moral philosophy is the search for a rational mechanism 
to resolve moral controversy.64  Although somewhat circular, this 
definition explains that moral philosophy is an attempt to develop 
standards to evaluate, criticize, and ultimately categorize the 
distinction between right and wrong conduct.65  The term “moral 
philosophy” is often used interchangeably with the term “ethics,” 
which is defined as the study of standards of conduct and moral 
judgment.66 
Contemporary moral philosophy is comprised of competing 
theories, each advancing the supremacy of a distinct interest or 
theme.  There are numerous well-developed ethical theories,67 
however, the following two theories stand out as particularly useful in 
evaluating the morality of a ban on human cloning: utilitarianism 
and deontology.  Briefly stated, utilitarianism is a consequence-based 
theory, holding that actions are right or wrong according to the 
 
 64 JEFFRIE MURPHY & JULES COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO JURISPRUDENCE 73 (1984).  I have previously discussed the application of moral 
philosophy to another bioethical dilemma, selective reduction of multiple 
pregnancy.  Some of the foundational discussion about moral philosophy derives 
from that work.  See Judith F. Daar, Selective Reduction of Multiple Pregnancy: Lifeboat 
Ethics in the Womb, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 773, 823 (1992). 
 65 I derive this explanation of Murphy and Coleman’s definition of moral 
philosophy, supra note 64, from C.E. HARRIS JR., APPLYING MORAL THEORIES 2 (1986). 
 66 HARRIS, supra note 65, at 2.  Harris argues that moral philosophy is synonymous 
with ethics because it involves a set of specifically elaborated principles of ethics.  Id. 
 67 See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 
44 (4th ed. 1994).  In their groundbreaking work, Beauchamp and Childress 
concentrate on several types of ethical theories, including utilitarianism, Kantianism, 
character ethics, liberal individualism, communitarianism, the ethics of care, 
casuistry, and common-morality accounts.  While each of these theories could be 
applied to the morality of a cloning ban, I have focused on the two theories that I 
believe yield the most interesting contrast in analysis. 
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balance of their good and bad consequences.68  Deontology, in 
contrast, assesses whether an action has independent moral weight.69  
Deontologists believe that features of an action other than, or in 
addition to, consequences make that action right or wrong.70  These 
somewhat competing ethical theories provide an interesting starting 
point for assessing the morality of a ban on human cloning. 
1.  Banning Human Cloning: A View From Utilitarianism 
The essential core of utilitarianism is the idea that human 
actions and practices should be evaluated ultimately in terms of their 
tendencies to advance the general welfare or social good.  Put 
another way, utilitarianism seeks to have human actions result in the 
happiness or well-being of a majority of persons.  It is often explained 
by reference to the mantra, “‘The greatest happiness for the greatest 
number.’”71  It advocates following the course of action that leads to 
the best possible consequences.  Thus, the ends are permitted to 
justify the means.  In the cloning context, utilitarianism would hold 
that cloning should be permitted if it would maximize overall social 
welfare, even if in the process it would be damaging to some 
individuals. 
To begin a utilitarian analysis, it is essential to marshal the good 
and bad consequences that cloning might produce.  It is important to 
note, however, that any perceived benefits or harms are at this point 
speculative, as we have not yet succeeded in cloning a human being.  
The speculative nature of the consequences of cloning points out the 
difficulty in assessing the moral rightness or wrongness of the 
technique.  Our application of utilitarianism, or any other moral 
theory, relies on having some grounding in the action to be studied.  
In the case of cloning, we must juxtapose the anticipated good 
outcomes with the perceived bad consequences.  Once the science of 
cloning begins to emerge, we may find ourselves shifting the 
utilitarian analysis to meet the realities of the technique.72 
 
 68 Id. at 47. 
 69 Id. at 56-57. 
 70 Id. at 56. 
 71 See MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 64, at 74 (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, 
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1789)). 
 72 In fact, utilitarians view themselves as responsive to changing social and 
scientific conditions.  They believe that actions should be evaluated in light of 
existing social conditions, thus happiness is measured relative to prevailing social 
norms.  BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 67, at 48-49. 
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a.  Possible Benefits of Reproductive Cloning 
The ethics of utilitarianism could justify a ban on human cloning 
if the balance of bad consequences outweighs the good 
consequences.  Much has been written about the potential good and 
bad consequences that cloning portends, thus what follows is a brief 
overview of the anticipated consequences of human SCNT. 
Identifying the  possible benefits of cloning is the first step.  If 
cloning proves a safe and effective method of reproduction, it could 
aid couples and individuals in several ways.  Couples who are 
refractory to current infertility treatment would be able to have a 
genetically related child through cloning.  For example, couples in 
which both the male and female lack gametes73 are unable to produce 
a child without the aid of gamete donors.  Cloning would allow such 
a couple to experience the joys of parenting a child whose genes 
derive from one member of the pair.  In this capacity, cloning would 
join a growing spectrum of assisted reproductive technologies that 
currently aids tens of thousands of individuals in realizing their 
dreams of parenthood.74  Because of its complexity and likely 
expense, it would serve as a last resort for most couples who desire to 
parent a genetically-related child, but nevertheless it would likely 
bring tremendous happiness to those couples who successfully avail 
themselves of the technique. 
In addition to aiding infertile couples, cloning could also be 
used to avoid transmission of deleterious genetic traits to offspring.  
In light of our growing familiarity with genetically-based disease 
processes, we are increasingly aware that the key to maintaining our 
health lies more in the past than it does in the future.  The Human 
Genome Project has revealed the genetic bases of many diseases and 
is now beginning to pinpoint the exact location of genes thought to 
be responsible for these ailments.75  If a couple is aware that one 
 
 73 This could occur, for example, if the woman lacked ovaries due to treatment 
for a disease process, and the man lacked sperm due to radiation therapy to treat 
testicular cancer.  If the woman still had a uterus she could gestate the cloned 
embryo and also experience the wonders of pregnancy. 
 74 In the year 1998 alone, assisted reproductive technologies were the means of 
conception in the births of 29,128 children.  The technologies include in vitro 
fertilization and embryo transfer, gamete intrafallopian transfer, and zygote 
intrafallopian transfer.  See Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United States: 1998 
Results Generated From The American Society for Reproductive Medicine/Society for Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Registry, 77 FERTILITY & STERILITY 18-19 (2002). 
 75 See Michael J. Smith, Population-Based Genetic Studies: Informed Consent and 
Confidentiality, 18 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 57, 62 (2001) (reporting that “over 
5,000 human disorders are known to have a genetic basis and over 1,000 of those 
disorders have been mapped to specific regions of the genome”). 
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member is a carrier for a genetically-linked disease, cloning may be a 
sure way to avoid passing that gene to the couple’s offspring.  As with 
infertility treatment, cloning may not necessarily be the first choice 
for a couple in this position, as current technologies offer numerous 
alternatives to prospective parents wishing to avoid deleterious gene 
transmission.  In addition to the use of donor gametes, couples can 
use preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to learn about the 
health of their embryos before they are implanted into the uterus.76  
Using PGD, the couple can select for implantation only the 
unaffected embryos in an effort to maximize the health of their child.  
Cloning, however, may be more attractive to couples wishing to avoid 
deleterious gene transmission because it does not involve the 
deliberate destruction of affected embryos.  In the end, cloning could 
benefit those couples who wish to avoid passing on one partner’s 
genome because of its health implications.77 
A third possible benefit of cloning would be to assist single 
individuals and same sex couples in their efforts to reproduce.  These 
prospective parents may wish to procreate without the aid and 
potential entanglement of gamete donors.78  For single individuals 
and same sex couples wishing to parent a genetically-related child, 
cloning offers benefits that are unmatched by current reproductive 
technologies.  For this group, the use of donor gametes may be 
particularly unattractive because of its potential to raise parentage 
issues.  Lesbian couples that use artificial insemination by donor 
(AID) risk sperm donors’ paternity claims once the child is born.  In 
some cases, courts uphold these claims, warning that AID donors 
relinquish their parental rights only if the recipient woman follows a 
statutory protocol surrounding the insemination.79  Single and gay 
 
 76 Y. Verlinsky et al., Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: An Integral Part of Assisted 
Reproduction, 17 J. ASSIST. REPROD. & GENETICS 75, 76 (2000). 
 77 Realistically we must bear in mind that the lack of known deleterious genes in 
the unaffected partner does not mean that the individual lacks genes related to 
disease processes.  We are in the infancy stage of our knowledge of genes and their 
relationship to health.  The use of cloning or PGD to avoid transmission of certain 
genes may still produce children who suffer from genetically-based illnesses and 
syndromes. 
 78 Of course, in the case of males who wish to have a genetically related child 
through cloning, a gestational carrier will be necessary to gestate the embryo to term.  
But even for these males, the absence of an egg donor may be important to avoid 
possible parental claims in the future. 
 79 See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386 (1986) (refusing to apply a 
statute, providing that a sperm donor is treated in law as if he were not the natural 
father of the child conceived, because a donor provided sperm directly to the 
mother rather than to a licensed physician, as specified in statute); C.O. v. W.S., 639 
N.E.2d 523 (1994) (holding that failure to comply with statutory medical 
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men also face claims by egg donors and genetic surrogates whose link 
to the child may also entitle them to parental rights.  Cloning may 
alleviate some of these worries by eliminating gamete donors from 
the procreation equation. 
Another beneficial use of cloning would be to aid parents who 
have suffered the loss of a child.  This use would require that parents 
preserve some number of cells from their child, either before the 
child dies or even shortly after death.80  Of course, the cloned child 
would not be the same human being as the deceased child, but his or 
her genetic similarity to the passed sibling may provide enormous 
solace to the parents.  In fact, reproductive cloning to respond to the 
loss of a child has motivated couples to support underground cloning 
efforts in the United States.81  Clearly, these parents believe that 
cloning would be a benefit to them.  Critics wonder, however, 
whether the cloned child, even if born healthy, would benefit from 
conception in this manner and under these circumstances.82  Would 
the parents harbor unrealistic expectations of the child that would 
negatively impact that child’s life?  Perhaps a utilitarian analysis 
would weigh the parents’ happiness and the value attributable to the 
child being born against the child’s unhappiness.  If the overall 
benefit is thought to outweigh the harms, an uncompromising 
utilitarian would approve of cloning in this circumstance.83 
In summary, at least four groups could reap benefits from 
reproductive cloning: infertile couples refractory to treatment with 
 
requirements for artificial insemination prevents a mother from invoking the statute 
to obtain dismissal of her sperm donor’s complaint to determine paternity, custody, 
support, and visitation); cf. Lamaritata v. Lucas, 823 So. 2d 316 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 
2002) (holding a sperm donor was not a parent and had no parental rights or 
responsibilities under a statute governing artificial insemination). 
 80 The idea of post-mortem reproductive cloning is no longer strictly a science 
fiction idea.  In 2001, scientists announced that they had successfully cloned a calf 
from a cow that had been dead for 48 hours.  Using a cooling method, the cow’s cells 
were removed two days after death and then the nuclei were extracted and injected 
into enucleated egg cells.  See Rebecca McCarthy, UGA Clones Calf from Dead Animal, 
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 26, 2002, at 1A. 
 81 See infra notes 296-301 and accompanying text. 
 82 Additional concerns surround the scenario where a child dies from an 
inheritable disease and the parents choose to clone that child with the hope that new 
treatments will be available for the later-born child.  In this situation, parents are 
purposefully causing the birth of a child who is highly likely to suffer during life and 
experience a premature death.  While one might question the competency or 
compassion of parents who pursue this course of action, nothing in our current law 
prevents parents with known genetic disease markers from conceiving children and 
risking transmission to these offspring. 
 83 I borrow the term “uncompromising utilitarian” from BEAUCHAMP & 
CHILDRESS, supra note 67, at 49. 
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other assisted reproductive technologies; couples wishing to assure 
avoidance of a deleterious genetic trait; single and same sex couples 
who eschew the use of gamete donors, but who wish to have a child 
that is genetically related to them; and parents who wish to clone a 
deceased child.  These individuals would argue that cloning is 
uniquely capable of providing them the parenting opportunities they 
seek.  A ban on cloning would significantly harm these individuals 
because there are no alternatives that fulfill their specific desires.  
The overall utility of cloning, however, can only be evaluated by 
weighing both benefits and harms.  The next section explores some 
of the counterbalancing perceived harms of reproductive cloning. 
b.  Possible Harms of Reproductive Cloning 
When Dolly’s birth was first announced in 1997, the popular 
press was replete with dire warnings about the evils of human 
cloning.84  In the past six years, numerous scholars, commentators, 
and policymakers have weighed in on the cloning debate, with the 
vast majority counseling against the use of human reproductive 
cloning.85  What follows is a modest attempt to highlight a few of the 
many objections to this emerging reproductive technology. 
First, and perhaps most importantly, there are tremendous 
concerns over the safety and efficacy of human cloning.86  To date, 
despite claims to the contrary we have seen no evidence of any 
human being conceived through SCNT.87  As a result, we do not know 
what that process would yield in the human reproductive setting.  
Moreover, animal studies reveal that in some cases the cloned 
offspring suffer from health problems related to structural and 
functional abnormalities.88  While we do not yet know how the data 
collected on animals will translate to the human population, at the 
very least we know that the safety of human cloning is not assured.  
Of course, the safety of reproduction in any form is never certain, but 
at least with existing technologies we are familiar with the risk profiles 
associated with each technique. 
A second harm often cited is the threat cloning poses to the 
 
 84 See supra note 35. 
 85 See supra notes 17-57 and accompanying text. 
 86 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Visions: Biology: A Genetic Future Both Tantalizing and 
Disturbing; A Small Leap to Designer Babies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2000, at E7 (reporting a 
retired Harvard Biology Professor’s concern that “the risk of creating deformed 
babies is too great”). 
 87 See supra note 62. 
 88 See infra notes 231-38 and accompanying text. 
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individuality of the cloned child.89  The worry is that society would 
view the child as a mere replica of the cell donor and, therefore, 
undervalue the child’s unique selfhood.  Whatever talents or 
idiosyncrasies attached to the donor would be expected of the child, 
with no care paid to allowing the child to develop an individualized 
personality.  Parents might expect the child to make the same life 
choices made by the cell donor and might mete out severe 
repercussions if the child fails to satisfy these expectations.90  On a 
grander scale, cloning might threaten the individuality of the human 
race.  If cloning becomes widespread, it would reduce the number of 
unique genomes born in our world, creating classification of persons 
according to the perceived worth of their genes.  We would cease 
valuing individuality and instead fixate on the predetermined genetic 
destiny attached to the cloned person. 
An oft-cited response to concerns about individuality is that a 
clone would be born as an infant in a different familial setting and in 
a different historical time frame.91  Unique circumstances and events 
would shape the child’s life, as cloning certainly does not expose the 
child to the formative environment of the cell donor.  The child’s 
future would be as open as any naturally conceived child, both of 
whom may have parents who harbor great expectations for their 
children.  A parent’s expectations for his or her child would probably 
not change in a cloning scenario, as expectations are often based on 
the parent’s own accomplishments and failures.  Whether those 
accomplishments and failures derive from one genome or two would  
not likely alter parents’ attitudes toward their children.  Moreover, 
concerns that the same genetic diseases plaguing the cell donor will 
also affect the clone are not necessarily well-founded.  Advances in 
genetic diagnosis and gene therapy have progressed at a rapid pace 
 
 89 HCHD REPORT, supra note 46, at Executive Summary; see also Carolyn Wilson, 
Statement in the Ad Hoc Committee on the International Convention Against the Reproductive 
Cloning of Human Beings, February 26, 2002, 18 ISS. IN L. & MED. 187 (2000). 
 90 One author has labeled this phenomenon as depriving a child of “a right to an 
open future.”  See Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to An Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD? 
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124 (W. Aiken & H. 
LaFollette eds., 1980); see also Dena S. Davis, Genetic Dilemmas and the Child’s Right to 
an Open Future, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 549 (1997).  This argument rests on a notion of 
genetic determinism, that one’s genome determines one’s future.  A child with a 
duplicated genome would lack the opportunity to determine his or her own future, 
or at the very least would be aware of the life choices and life struggles that afflicted 
the cell donor.  This knowledge alone would limit the “open future” for cloned 
individuals who might be herded into the same life path followed by their 
predecessors. 
 91 See Michael A. Goldman, Human Cloning: Science, Fact and Fiction, 8 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 103 (1998). 
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in the past ten years and are predicted to accelerate with each passing 
day.92  We have learned much about the genetic bases of certain 
diseases, such as coronary artery disease and hypertension, which are 
diseases that are highly responsive to newly developed therapies and 
studied lifestyle changes.  Since many gene-linked diseases do not 
develop until adulthood, a cloned child could reasonably assume that 
a treatment for his or her particular disease would be available when 
needed. 
A third harm expressed about cloning is the threat of 
commodification of children.93  If and when cloning becomes 
available for reproduction, it will likely enter the market at an 
extraordinarily high price.  The expenses surrounding human 
cloning are already a topic of discussion, and these costs are out of 
reach for the vast majority of prospective parents.94  For those few 
wealthy individuals who do avail themselves of the emerging 
technology, there is concern that they will treat their cloned children 
as commodities, rather than as individual human beings, because 
their births were orchestrated at an enormous financial cost.95  
Parents, it is argued, will expect a return on their investment much in 
the way any investor seeks profit, and thus will be intolerant of any 
perceived imperfection in their “product.” 
It may be worth noting that similar concerns have been raised 
over other reproductive scenarios.  These include surrogate 
parenting arrangements in which a woman is paid to gestate another 
couple’s embryo, and the creation of embryos using donor gametes 
in which prospective parents pay for gametes that meet their 
specifications.96  Both of these arrangements involve the expenditure 
 
 92 See U.S. Gene Therapy Markets, reported in MEDICINE & HEALTH’S BUSINESS ALERT 
13 (2002) (predicting in a report released on February 11, 2002 that gene therapy 
products will be introduced worldwide in 2004 and will generate approximately $125 
million in annual revenues; these products include 134 genomic oncology drugs 
currently in Phase II clinical trials and seven drugs in Phase III trials) (on file with 
author). 
 93 E.D. Pellegrino, Balancing Science, Ethics, and Politics: Stem Cell Research, A 
Paradigm Case, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 591, 609 (2002) (noting that “the 
likelihood of extension of commodification to human cells is unfortunately high”). 
 94 See James A. Haught & Tara Tuckwiller, Cloning Effort Hidden in West Virginia 
Town; Father Wanted to Duplicate Dead Son, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2001, at A1 
(reporting payment of $500,000 by a Charleston lawyer to a cloning group to clone 
his dead son). 
 95 John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1371, 
1399 (1998). 
 96 The costs associated with these two scenarios are hardly accessible to the 
average-salaried individual.  The average fee paid to a gestational carrier is $10,000.  
See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993) (describing a contract for 
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of significant funds, as does the use of assisted reproductive 
technologies in general.  The average cost for a single treatment 
using in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer is between $8,000 and 
$10,500,97 as compared to the absence of expenses associated with 
natural conception.  Yet nearly two decades of experience with 
collaborative and assisted reproduction, a process in which couples 
often spend their life savings in pursuit of parenthood, have not 
yielded a study showing that these parents regard their children as 
commodities.  In fact, psychological profiles conducted on the 
children of assisted reproduction show they are no different from 
their naturally conceived counterparts.98 
A final harm worthy of inclusion is the prediction that cloning 
will advance eugenics in our society.  Opponents postulate that 
through cloning it will be possible to develop both super- and sub-
human individuals to meet society’s needs, creating a class system 
beyond any naturally occurring division among the people of the 
world.  The clear distinctions among individuals will lead us to revere 
and shun certain genotypes, perhaps ultimately leading to the 
enslavement or destruction of the lesser class.99  What is so very sad 
about this Doomsday scenario is that history has proven that we do 
not need cloning to practice eugenics in our society.  The examples 
abound, including the Holocaust in World War II Germany, ethnic 
cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in the late 1990s, and the 
implementation of forced sterilization statutes to weed out “mental 
defectives” from American society in the 1920s.  Justice Holmes’ 
words of seventy-five years ago still ring eerily from his opinion in 
Buck v. Bell, when the Court upheld a Virginia statute allowing 
 
gestational services calling for payment of $10,000 to the gestational carrier).  In the 
case of egg donors, there have been reports of couples willing to pay upward of 
$100,000 to an egg donor who meets their highly specific criteria.  See Martha Frase-
Blunt, Ova-Compensating?; Women Who Donate Eggs to Infertile Couples Earn a Reward B 
But Pay a Price, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2001, at F1 (reporting on a half-page 
advertisement in the Stanford Daily offering $100,000 for the eggs of a donor “with 
proven college-level athletic ability”). 
 97 See Edward G. Hughes & Mita Giacomini, Funding In Vitro Fertilization Treatment 
for Persistent Subfertility: The Pain and the Politics, 76 FERTILITY & STERILITY 431, 437 
(2001). 
 98 See id. at 437 (reporting that no differences have been noted between IVF 
offspring and the general population up to the age of thirteen years). 
 99 See George J. Annas et al., Protecting the Endangered Human: Toward an 
International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 
151, 153 (2002) (describing human cloning as a crime against humanity “by taking 
human evolution into our own hands and directing it toward the development of a 
new species, sometimes termed the posthuman”) (citing to FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR 
POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION (2002)). 
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involuntary sterilization of mental defectives because “three 
generations of imbeciles are enough.”100 
Sadly, ordinary conception has already produced men capable of 
ferocious inhumanity unaided by any reproductive technology.  
Cloning will likely not provide any greater opportunity for 
manipulating our offspring than we currently enjoy.101  Using 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis, we can screen embryos for genetic 
traits, either deleterious or benign, and select those traits we find 
most desirable.  Moreover, the opportunities for collaborative 
reproduction allow parents to choose the phenotypes and genotypes 
that will combine to produce their child.  Nothing in our current law 
prevents parents from selecting egg and sperm donors of a particular 
stature, intelligence, race, etc. in order to attempt to “engineer” their 
children. 
To date, we have seen parents using the option of donor 
gametes in order to maximize the well-being of their children, with 
most families selecting donors who resemble them in appearance and 
family background.102  The children of assisted reproductive 
technology (ART), though they may have been engineered to some 
extent, are welcomed by their parents as any newborn is welcomed.103  
There is no logical reason why a cloned child would not receive the 
same treatment.  Children of cloned conception will be born into the 
world as any other child.  Their parents’ instincts for nurturing will or 
will not take hold, making these children no more or less likely than 
any other children to experience the joys and sorrows of life. 
The above discussion of the potential benefits and harms of 
human reproductive cloning, along with some of the 
 
 100 274 U.S. 200 (1927).  For a thorough discussion of the history of the American 
branch of the international eugenics movement, see Paul A. Lombardo, “The 
American Breed”: Nazi Eugenics and the Origins of the Pioneer Fund, 65 ALB. L. REV. 743 
(2002). 
 101 An interesting twist that emerges from experiments surrounding animal 
cloning is that cloned animals do not necessarily look like their genetic parent.  In 
the case of “cc” the cat, cloned by researchers at Texas A&M University in December 
2001, the cloned animal had a totally different fur pattern from her genetic mother.  
The reasons for this difference in phenotype can be explained by uterine influences 
during gestation, including the position of the fetus in the womb.  See Wes Allison, 
How Many Lives Now?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 24, 2002, at 1A.  While we still do 
not know whether findings in cloned animals will translate into humans, the 
experience with “cc” reinforces the notion that cloning is not replication; each 
individual animal takes on its own characteristics that make it a unique being. 
 102 See Frase-Blunt, supra note 96 (explaining that couples seeking egg donors “just 
want to find someone like themselves”). 
 103 Janet L. Dolgin, Suffer the Children: Nostalgia, Contradiction, and the New State of 
Reproductive Technologies, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473, 504 n.119 (1996). 
 2003 THE PROSPECT OF HUMAN CLONING 535 
counterarguments attendant to these assertions, is an essential 
starting place for a utilitarian analysis.  But a mere listing of utilities 
and disutilities does not answer the question of whether cloning is a 
morally correct act.  In the case of cloning, balancing the benefits 
and harms does not reveal a clear champion.  Both sides have merit; 
both demonstrate the happiness and angst that cloning can 
engender.  In addition to difficulties in discerning the morality of an 
action when the benefits and harms appear to be in equipoise, 
utilitarianism suffers other drawbacks as an ethical theory.  Those 
drawbacks are as applicable to cloning as to any other act where 
ethics are in question. 
c.  Criticisms of Utilitarianism as a Moral Theory 
All moral theories offer strengths and weaknesses in their ability 
to assess the moral rightness of human actions.  Perhaps the greatest 
strength of utilitarianism is its apparent simplicity.  Once the good 
and bad consequences of an action are assessed, a utilitarian can 
pronounce the action moral or immoral simply by balancing these 
findings.  Of course, making moral judgments is never easy, and this 
simplistic description of utilitarianism reveals at least two problems 
with the theory as a fully adequate measure of morality.  Briefly 
stated, utilitarianism has the potential to overstate benefits on the 
one hand, while disregarding detriments on the other. 
The problem with measuring the benefits of a certain action is 
that the notion of benefit is highly imprecise.  Utilitarians share the 
conviction that human actions should be assessed morally in terms of 
their production of maximal value, but they disagree over which 
values are most important.104  For some utilitarians, the value of 
happiness should be the sole measure of utility,105 while others argue 
that values other than happiness have intrinsic worth.106  Among these 
other values are knowledge, health, and personal autonomy.107  In the 
case of cloning, if happiness is the sole measure of utility, then the 
 
 104 BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 67, at 48. 
 105 The two most noted philosophers who hold this view are Jeremy Bentham and 
John Stuart Mill, often referred to as “hedonistic utilitarians” because they conceive 
utility entirely in terms of happiness and pleasure, two broad terms they treat as 
synonymous.  Id. (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 11-14, 31, 34 (1970); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 
207, 210, 214, 234-35 (Univ. of Toronto Press 1969)). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Additional values include friendship, beauty, achievement and success, 
understanding, enjoyment, and deep personal relationships.  Id. (citing G.E. MOORE, 
PRINCIPIA ETHICA 90 (1903)); see also JAMES GRIFFEN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, 
MEASUREMENT AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 67 (1986). 
 536 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:511 
happiness of the parents derived from rearing a cloned child would 
outweigh the difficulties experienced by the child because of physical 
or psychological infirmities.108  The two parents’ happiness would also 
likely outweigh any generalized concerns over the impact of cloning 
on society, because individual happiness trumps speculative societal 
harms. 
In addition to imprecision in the measure of utility, an objection 
to utilitarianism is the subjective nature of benefit.  An individual can 
express a preference that would be viewed as morally unacceptable 
under prevailing social norms, yet that individual will derive 
happiness by exercising that preference.  Here, the theory of 
utilitarianism must struggle with determining whether individual 
preferences should be the measure of utility, or whether preferences 
must fit within prevailing norms.109  For example, if a parent cloned a 
child solely to serve as a solid organ donor for an ill sibling, we might 
condemn that action and seek to prevent it.110  In our society, we 
value parents who embrace each of their children for his or her 
individual self-worth.  A parental preference that would involve 
killing a child to save another should cause us to question the 
soundness of a utility equation where three people are benefitted and 
only one is harmed, when that harm involves unacceptable moral 
(and legal) consequences. 
As noted above, utilitarianism is problematic in its relative and 
absolute assessment of benefit.  Perhaps even more troubling, 
however, is its dismissal of harm and tendency toward a tyranny of the 
majority.  Since the principles of utilitarianism dictate that the 
interests of the majority are to override the rights of the minority, the 
harms suffered by a few would be dismissed as unimportant in the 
overall utilitarian calculus.  In a cloning scenario, the harms may be 
profoundly damaging to a few individuals, so much so that their 
objections should not be disregarded.  If cloning produces children 
who are severely impaired and who suffer greatly during their 
 
 108 Some might argue that a cloned child derives happiness just from being born, 
even if the child experiences suffering during his or her life.  This happiness, 
combined with the parents’ happiness at the opportunity to rear a cloned child, 
could outweigh the unhappiness experienced collectively by the parents and the 
child, deeming reproductive cloning a morally acceptable act when measured in 
terms of happiness alone. 
 109 See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 67, at 53. 
 110 This scenario should be contrasted with one in which parents conceive a child 
to aid an ailing child, but also intend to nurture that new child as an integral part of 
their family.  In these cases, the newly conceived child is subjected to minimal harm 
and would presumably receive the same love and nurturing bestowed upon the ailing 
child. 
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shortened lifetimes, their conception could be morally justified using 
utilitarian logic if their parents, and the physicians and researchers 
who helped develop the technology for their birth, derive great 
happiness from the accomplishment of creating a cloned human 
being.  In thinking about whether a ban on human cloning can be 
morally justified, it is difficult to dismiss the potential harm to the 
cloned individuals, even if the vast majority of those affected incur 
tremendous benefit.111  Conversely, if only a few members of society 
fear the repercussions of cloning, and the vast majority, including the 
cloned individuals themselves, are greatly benefited, overriding the 
harms anticipated by those who are not directly affected by the 
technology may be morally justified under utilitarian theory. 
In the end, assessing the morality of a ban on human cloning is 
difficult to accomplish using utilitarian principles because the science 
has yet to reveal any actual benefits or harms to human beings.  The 
danger with proceeding to develop the science is, of course, that the 
harms to cloned individuals will overwhelm any benefits.  For this 
reason alone, many have supported a total ban on human 
reproductive cloning.112  But as noted in Part II.C., whether or not a 
ban is enacted in the United States or abroad, cloning researchers 
will continue to pursue the holy grail that human cloning has 
become.  Perhaps the better approach is to minimize the harms by 
dedicating the most talented and highly organized scientific teams to 
unravel the cloning mysteries, rather than allowing underground and 
sporadic efforts to cause unnecessary pain and suffering. 
2.  Banning Human Cloning: A View From Deontology 
The moral theory of deontology holds that the moral worth of 
an individual’s action depends exclusively on the moral acceptability 
of the rule on which that person acts.113  Thus, deontologists look not 
to the consequences of an action, but rather to whether the act 
conforms to an overriding moral duty.  An act would be considered 
morally right if it fulfilled a morally acceptable principle; an act 
would be judged wrong by a deontologist if it violated a moral duty or 
principle.  The deontological ethic is closely associated with 
 
 111 The following vivid illustration nicely describes the problem of the tyranny of 
the majority in a utilitarian calculus: A healthy young patient goes to her physician 
for a routine physical examination only to be killed for her organs so that five dying 
patients can be saved.  Utilitarianism would likely favor such action because one dead 
is better than five dead.  See Judith J. Thomson, Comment, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE 
L.J. 1395, 1406-15 (1985). 
 112 See supra PART I. 
 113 BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 67, at 57-58. 
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Immanuel Kant114 and his moral rule or categorical imperative: “Act in 
such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in 
the person of another, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as 
an end.”115  Put in a more contemporary idiom, this imperative comes 
to the following: “All rational persons have a right not to be used 
without their consent even for the benefit of others.”116  The 
application of a deontological ethic to a ban on human cloning 
requires defining the relevant rules and duties that could potentially 
be advanced or violated by such a prohibition of conduct.  A ban on 
human cloning might be viewed as morally right because it fulfills a 
duty that human beings have to avoid inflicting harm to others.  
Since some of the early cloning studies conducted on animals showed 
that some animals suffered life-threatening impairments,117 a 
deontologist might argue that attempting human cloning is immoral 
because it may cause harm to cloned children, thus violating a moral 
duty to maximize the well-being of our offspring.  Under a different 
set of scientific assumptions, however, human cloning could be seen 
as morally acceptable.  If cloning proves safe and effective, couples 
who wish to avoid transmission of a deleterious genetic trait may be 
fulfilling the moral duty of maximizing their child’s welfare by 
utilizing the technique. 
Deontology, like utilitarianism, fails to provide a full and 
adequate theory of the moral life.118  Criticisms of deontology focus 
on the nature and hierarchy of the moral duties that are the 
foundation of this moral theory.119  Two specific problems that seem 
relevant to the cloning dilemma are the problem of conflicting 
obligations and the fallacy of moral absolutism.  Both of these 
problems allow us to think deeper about the moral obligations we 
believe should motivate human conduct, as well as the obligations 
that actually do cause us to act. 
 
 114 Id. at 56. 
 115 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 96 (H.J. Paton 
trans., 1964) (emphasis in original).  For a discussion of autonomy, rights, and the 
treatment of persons as ends in themselves in Kantian theory, see MURPHY & 
COLEMAN, supra note 64, at 78-86. 
 116 MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 64, at 83. 
 117 Rosie Mestel, Dolly’s Death Resurrects Debate on Cloning Ethics, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 
2003, at A1 (noting that “[a] growing number of studies suggest that clones—even 
the ones that make it to adulthood—may carry within them subtle genetic 
abnormalities that could cause medical problems later in life”). 
 118 BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 67, at 60. 
 119 Id. at 60-62. 
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a.  Deontology and the Problem of Conflicting Obligations 
The problem of conflicting obligations arises when an individual 
faces a choice of action that will result in the fulfillment of one moral 
duty while another is violated.120  Since deontology makes all moral 
rules absolute, whatever course of action is taken will necessarily 
involve violation of some moral duty.  For example, if an only child 
was involved in an automobile accident and suffered from kidney 
failure as a result, the parents might make the decision to clone the 
sick child to conceive and rear another child who could serve as a 
kidney donor at an appropriate age.  Here the parents would face two 
competing obligations: the duty to maximize the well-being of their 
child, and the duty to avoid treating any child as a means to an end.  
The parents might argue that cloning would not violate the latter 
duty in this case because the new child would be welcomed as a 
blessed addition to the family.  Similarly, the parents might argue 
that not availing themselves of cloning violates their duty to care for 
their ailing child. 
A ban on cloning does raise interesting questions about the 
moral obligations that surround human reproduction.  We could find 
cloning inherently immoral because parents would use cloning only 
to satisfy their own selfish, narcissistic, and unreasonable desires.  
Interestingly, the same claims can be made of ordinary reproduction, 
yet a ban on traditional procreation hardly seems a popular idea.  
Comparatively, we could find a ban on human cloning inherently 
immoral because it deprives many individuals the opportunity to 
reproduce in a manner that maximizes their well-being and thus 
correspondingly maximizes the well-being of their children.  If 
protection of reproductive autonomy is a value worthy of moral 
obligation, then banning cloning would violate our moral duty to 
assure procreative freedom. 
b.  Deontology and the Problem of Moral Absolutism 
A second criticism of deontology is its assumption about the 
moral rightness and wrongness of human conduct.  Deontologists 
operate from the premise that there are moral absolutes in the world; 
certain conduct is morally correct and other actions are morally 
wrong.121  But in our diverse and changing world, a system that 
depends on moral absoluteness is destined for challenge.  Who or 
what is to be the arbiter of moral rightness?  Actions that a large 
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group might consider morally wrong an equally large group could 
view as morally acceptable.  A Gallup Poll conducted in March 2002 is 
a chilling illustration that one person’s sin is another person’s 
sanctity.122  The poll asked citizens of Kuwait, the country the United 
States defended in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, if the September 11, 
2001 attacks on the World Trade Center could be morally justified.123  
A full thirty-six percent responded that the perpetrators were morally 
justified in killing nearly 3000 individuals.124  Though the survey was 
not conducted on U.S. citizens, it seems reasonable to assume that 
few if any Americans would find moral justification for the September 
11th attacks. 
Clearly, morality is a complicated concept.  One can assess the 
morality of a ban on human reproductive cloning according to any of 
the various ethical theories that comprise the field of moral 
philosophy.  No single theory is necessarily superior to another and 
each could add a unique analysis to the moral evaluation of human 
cloning.  Thus far, we have considered the ethics of cloning from the 
perspectives of utilitarianism and deontology.  From the standpoint 
of utility, a balance of the benefits and harms of human cloning does 
not reveal a clear moral choice.  To date, the benefits and harms are 
largely unknown, thus the weighing of good and bad consequences is 
purely a matter of speculation.  If cloning proves a safe and effective 
method of reproduction, however, then it seems likely that a 
utilitarian would approve of the process for the benefits it could 
provide to numerous individuals. 
The benefits of aiding infertile couples, single and gay couples, 
parents who wish to avoid passing a deleterious gene to a child, and 
parents seeking solace for the death of a child would probably 
outweigh the more speculative harms such as the effacement of 
individuality, the commodification of children, and the advancement 
of eugenics.  These latter two harms have been previously raised in 
the context of emerging reproductive technologies such as in vitro 
fertilization, preimplantation genetic diagnosis, and the use of donor 
gametes, but there is no evidence that these harms have come to pass.  
The argument that cloning threatens individuality must be assessed 
under the presumption that each cloned child would be born in the 
same manner as other children—following gestation by an intended 
 
 122 See Dave Moniz, Some Kuwaitis Dispute Anti-U.S. Results, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 
2002, at 11A (reporting on a February 2002 Gallup Poll in which thirty-six percent of 
Kuwaitis found the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center “morally justified,” 
while forty-one percent held an unfavorable opinion of the United States). 
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mother or gestational carrier—and that the child would experience 
the world in his or her own unique way.  Different historical time 
frames, different parents, different extended family, and even 
different uterine environments assure that the cloned individual will 
not lead the same life as the cell donor.  At most, cloning provides a 
glimpse into the future, but it is far from a magical crystal ball. 
A moral assessment of a cloning ban from a deontological 
perspective is challenging because of the competing and uncertain 
moral obligations that surround both reproductive technologies and 
the advancement of science.  If it is moral to thwart research efforts 
that could potentially benefit humankind because of legitimate safety 
concerns, then deontologists would find human cloning morally 
unacceptable, at least until safety could be assured and perhaps even 
thereafter.  But if mankind has a moral obligation to advance our 
understanding of the creation of human life, then we can morally 
pursue the safest methods of human cloning.  Because each 
individual brings his or her own moral compass to this debate, the 
morality of a ban on human cloning is not readily apparent. 
B.  Is a Ban on Human Cloning Legal? 
The groundswell of support for a ban on human reproductive 
cloning proceeds seemingly unencumbered by concerns about the 
legality of such a measure.  Proponents of a cloning ban speak little, 
if at all, about the legal or constitutional merits of forestalling 
scientific inquiry into the workings of human SCNT.  The popularity 
of a ban on reproductive cloning assumes the mantle of legality, if for 
no other reason than the popular outrage that would follow any 
decision to the contrary.  It may be the case that public support for a 
ban on reproductive cloning is so strong that any legal challenge to 
an enacted ban would be summarily dismissed, with no judge willing 
to be perceived as dooming the human species.125 
While those in the political arena seem to have confidence in 
the inevitable legality of cloning bans, other commentators have 
questioned whether a total ban on this form of human reproduction 
 
 125 Needless to say, our judicial system is replete with judges who are fully willing 
and capable of striking down even the most popular measures because they run afoul 
of existing constitutional principles.  Coincidentally, one such decision was handed 
down as this article was being written.  In Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th 
Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a school district’s policy 
requiring teacher-led recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance and a statute inserting 
the words “under God” into the Pledge violated the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. 
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could pass constitutional muster.126  The scholars who have weighed 
in on the question are impressive in both their number and breadth 
of knowledge in matters of reproductive jurisprudence.127  For this 
reason, this Part will attempt to marshal the prior commentary and 
analysis on the legal aspects of a cloning ban, ultimately agreeing with 
those who conclude that neutral application of constitutional 
jurisprudence supports a finding that a total ban on reproductive 
cloning is unconstitutional.  At the same time, I confess a healthy 
skepticism that any American court in the foreseeable future would 
reach the same result. 
Having set forth this prediction of discord between merit and 
result, let us look briefly at two of the major arguments against 
enforcement of a total ban on reproductive cloning.  Please note that 
other scholars have ably analyzed the legality of cloning bans, often 
focusing on the several constitutional infirmities that these ever-
popular statutes display.128  My aim is to present the two strongest 
arguments against a total ban on human cloning.  The challenges 
discussed herein are as follows: 1) federal and state cloning bans 
violate procreative liberty by depriving individuals of reproductive 
choice, and 2) existing cloning bans are unconstitutionally vague 
because they fail to define explicitly what conduct is unlawful.129  Both 
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are unconstitutionally vague, infringe upon a constitutional right of scientific 
inquiry, or infringe upon the right to make reproductive decisions); Cohen, supra 
note 127, at 527-42 (discussing cloning as it relates to reproductive freedom, 
principles of Equal Protection, and freedom of speech); Foley, supra note 127, at 677-
709 (discussing cloning bans and the First Amendment right of scientific inquiry, the 
Due Process Clause procreational liberty interest, and the Equal Protection Clause). 
 129 A third challenge that I initially considered viable, but ultimately dismissed, is 
the assertion that a federal ban on cloning would exceed the federal government’s 
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of these arguments are worthy of exploration as each proceeds from a 
well-established body of constitutional jurisprudence.  Yet, the unique 
aspects of cloning will undoubtedly influence the analogies and 
distinctions to existing practices that traditionally guide our courts’ 
legal reasoning. 
1.  Does a Cloning Ban Violate Protected Procreational 
Liberty? 
A total ban on human reproductive cloning would outlaw a 
method by which children are conceived, an unprecedented action 
in American jurisprudence.130  Over the past century, our courts have 
produced a rich and evolving body of law wrestling with cases in 
which governmental bodies have sought to regulate the conduct 
surrounding conception, gestation, and childbirth.131  On balance, 
this body of law has displayed deference to each individuals right to 
make highly personal decisions regarding conception and 
childbirth.132  In the oft-cited quote from Justice Brennan, we are 
assured that “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of 
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”133  Whether 
cloning would enjoy the protections of this and other established 
rights is now unknown, but has been the subject of much academic 
 
authority to regulate the practice of medicine.  The argument begins with the 
assertion that cloning is strictly a medical practice, the regulation of which is 
traditionally left to individual states.  See State of Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 
1077 (D. Or. 2002).  I confess that even this prong of the argument is unlikely to 
hold up, given the groundswell of repugnance surrounding the technique.  Even if 
cloning is viewed as a medical practice governed by state standards, it seems well-
settled that national enactments may specify and clearly define what is lawful and 
what is not.  Id. at 1092.  Moreover, Congress’ authority to regulate, and even ban, 
human reproductive cloning can likely be found in the Commerce Clause, which 
gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 1.  As Professor Lori Andrews points out, there are numerous cases suggesting that 
the activities surrounding cloning would be considered to have a substantial impact 
on interstate commerce.  From the ordering of supplies to the luring of individuals 
from across state borders, any individual or facility that offered reproductive cloning 
could hardly remain an intrastate operator.  See Andrews, supra note 127, at 670-76. 
 130 The introduction of artificial insemination in the 1950s did bring calls for 
criminalization of this new technology, but ultimately no prohibitory statutes were 
enacted.  See Daar, supra note 57, at 171 (discussing the history of AID in the United 
States and abroad). 
 131 See infra notes 133-53 and accompanying text. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
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speculation.134 
In order to understand the protections accorded the right to 
procreational autonomy, we must begin with the text of the U.S. 
Constitution.  The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments prohibit, respectively, federal or state governments 
from depriving any individual of “life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law.”135  This constitutional language has been 
interpreted to contain a substantive component, meaning that the 
government must provide sufficient justification for taking away an 
individual’s life, liberty, or property.136  The level of judicial scrutiny 
accorded the government’s proferred justification depends upon the 
nature of the rights involved.  Courts will apply strict scrutiny to 
evaluate the infringement.137  Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the 
government will satisfy substantive due process only if it can prove 
that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling state purpose.138   
The inception of the substantive liberty interest and its 
protection of the right to procreate can be traced to the 1942 
decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma.139  In Skinner, the Court invalidated 
the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, which allowed 
 
 134 See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 127, at 666 (arguing cloning is too qualitatively 
different from normal reproduction to assume that the same Constitutional 
protections would apply); Foley, supra note 100, at 700-04 (concluding that cloning is 
a form of reproduction deserving the same protections as other forms of 
reproduction); Robertson, supra note 127, at 1391 (arguing that some forms of 
cloning show aspects of reproduction deserving of procreative liberty protection). 
 135 U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1. 
 136 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) 
(stating that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “has been 
understood to contain a substantive component as well, one ‘barring certain 
government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement 
them’”). 
 137 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that “[m]arriage 
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race, 
[thus] strict scrutiny is essential” when examining laws that seek to infringe on these 
rights). 
 138 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
419-20 (1997) (discussing the history and meaning of substantive due process). 
 139 316 U.S. 535 (1942).  An earlier case, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) 
first established that the liberty interest protected by the Constitution encompassed 
more than the right to be free from physical restraint.  The Court stated that the 
liberty interest of the Due Process Clause “denotes not merely freedom from bodily 
restraint but also the right of the individual . . . to marry, establish a home and bring 
up children . . . and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common 
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”  Id. at 399.  While 
Meyer implies a positive right of procreation, it is the later Skinner case that fully 
establishes the link between the Due Process liberty interest and the right to 
procreate. 
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courts to order the sterilization of individuals convicted two or more 
times for felonies involving “moral turpitude.”140  Writing for the 
Court, Justice Douglas described the right to have offspring as “one 
of the basic civil rights of man.”141  “Marriage and procreation,” one 
Justice explained, “are fundamental to the very existence and survival 
of the race.”142  One who is deprived by the state of the right to 
reproduce “is forever deprived of a basic liberty.”143  The holding and 
language in the decision indicate the Court’s designation of 
procreation as a fundamental right, deserving of protection against 
governmental restriction unless compelling reasons for interference 
can be shown.144 
Following Skinner, the jurisprudence surrounding procreation 
largely focused on state interference with the individual’s right to 
avoid procreation, either through the use of contraceptives,145 or by 
access to abortion.146  Though the cases addressed the specific rights 
of individuals to avoid procreation, the Supreme Court often spoke 
more broadly about the protections accorded reproduction as a 
positive right in our society.147  As noted above, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, a 
case invalidating a law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to 
unmarried individuals, Justice Brennan reminded us of the 
importance of procreation.  Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan 
spoke of the decision whether “to bear or beget a child” as a 
 
 140 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536. 
 141 Id. at 541. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 The Court in Skinner based its holding on the Equal Protection Clause, finding 
that the Oklahoma law forced sterilization upon certain habitual felons convicted of 
crimes of moral turpitude, while other habitual felons were untouched by the law.  
But the broad language regarding the right to procreate has been interpreted to 
mean that the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right 
“to have children.”  See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citing 
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535). 
 145 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (declaring 
unconstitutional a state law prohibiting the use and distribution of contraceptives); 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating a Massachusetts law that 
prohibited distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals); Carey v. 
Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding unconstitutional a New York 
law that made it a crime to sell or distribute contraceptives to minors under sixteen 
years of age). 
 146 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (declaring that the Constitution 
protects a woman’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy prior to fetal 
viability); Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (reaffirming the essential holding in Roe that the 
government may not ban abortions before viability, but may regulate abortion so 
long as it does not place an “undue burden” on access to abortions). 
 147 See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. 
 546 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:511 
protected right under the constitutional right to privacy.148  A quarter 
century later, the Court reiterated its view that procreation is a 
fundamental right.  In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court cited 
Skinner for the proposition that the “liberty” interest protected by the 
Due Process Clause includes the right “to have children.”149  Thus, 
whether grounded in a right of privacy or the liberty interest 
expressly contained in the Constitution, the idea is widely accepted 
that traditional coital reproduction is protected against governmental 
interference unless the state can show compelling reasons for 
imposing restrictions.150 
It is essential to consider that the above-described body of law 
dealing with procreational liberty and reproductive choice has arisen 
in the context of traditional conception through sexual intercourse.  
Whether these principles can be applied to noncoital forms of 
reproduction, including cloning, is the subject of intense debate and 
discussion.  For several years now, commentators have waxed 
eloquent about the applicability of a long-established procreative 
rights jurisprudence to newly emerging reproductive technologies 
that were virtually unknown when the relevant legal principles were 
being developed.  In the case of reproductive cloning, powerful 
arguments have been made both advocating and decrying the 
application of traditional, protective principles to this controversial 
form of reproduction.151 
On the one hand, some argue that cloning is a form of 
reproduction deserving of constitutional protection equal to that 
accorded other methods of childbearing.152  This argument assumes, 
of course, that other forms of non-traditional reproduction, such as 
in vitro fertilization and artificial insemination, receive the same 
substantive due process protections accorded coital reproduction.  
To date, courts have discussed this issue minimally, but there are 
scattered indications that courts would view certain forms of assisted 
reproduction on equal footing with traditional reproduction.153  
 
 148 California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 453 (1971). 
 149 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (citing Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535). 
 150 For a general discussion of the moral and legal arguments for procreative 
liberty, see JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 22-42 (1994). 
 151 See supra note 134. 
 152 Robertson, supra note 95, at 1389-1403. 
 153 The most direct indication of such parity can be found in Lifchez v. Hartigan, 
735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill.), aff’d mem., 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990), in which the 
district court held that the right to make procreative decisions encompasses the right 
of an infertile couple to undergo medically-assisted reproduction, including in vitro 
fertilization and the use of a donated embryo.  In plain and direct language, the 
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Professor John Robertson has written extensively about the moral and 
legal underpinnings for including certain forms of assisted 
reproduction within the bounds of procreative liberty.154  In the case 
of cloning, he argues that if current forms of assisted reproduction 
fall within prevailing notions of procreative freedom, “then a strong 
argument exists that some forms of cloning share certain aspects of 
procreative liberty as well, for cloning shares many features with 
assisted reproduction and genetic selection.”155 
Under Robertson’s view, the forms of cloning that should be 
accorded procreative liberty protections are those in which an 
individual has a gestational or biological relationship to the cloned 
child, coupled with an intent to rear that child.156  In the normal 
course, constitutional protections have vested in those who either 
bear (gestate)157—or beget (produce)158—a child, that is, to those who 
are traditionally considered the mother and father of the child.  In 
the case of cloning, the “bearer” would be the gestational carrier of 
the cloned embryo and the “begetter” would be the DNA donor.159  
Essentially, Robertson makes the argument that these individuals 
would not necessarily be entitled to constitutional protection if they 
lacked the intent to rear the resulting child.160  He argues, “[a]ny 
right to clone by persons who do not intend to rear would have to 
derive from the right of those who end up rearing.”161  The reason for 
this somewhat restrictive view, Robertson explains, is to anticipate 
and squarely address the oft-expressed concern that cloning will 
disaggregate the reproductive and rearing processes, leaving children 
the victims of adult grandiosity and ambition.162  According 
procreative liberty protection to those who engage in cloning without 
the intent to rear, Robertson warns, “seems to treat children like 
 
court explained, “It takes no great leap of logic to see that within the cluster of 
constitutionally protected choices that includes the right to have access to 
contraceptives, there must be included within that cluster the right to submit to a 
medical procedure that may bring about, rather than prevent, pregnancy.”  Id. at 
1377. 
 154 See Robertson, supra note 95. 
 155 Id. at 1391.  The most notable similarities include the enabling of married 
couples to have healthy, biologically related children for rearing, or allowing a 
couple to obtain a source of tissue for transplant to an ailing child.  Id. 
 156 Id. at 1395-1404. 
 157 Bear is defined as “to give birth to.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 75 (1974). 
 158 Beget is defined as “to become the father of.”  Id. at 77. 
 159 For a fuller discussion of the constitutional protections afforded gestational 
and biological parents, see  Foley, supra note 127, at  700-02 (2000). 
 160 Id. at 1398-99. 
 161 Robertson, supra note 95, at 1399. 
 162 Id. 
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fungible commodities produced for profit without regard to their 
well-being.  It should not be deemed part of the initiating couple’s 
procreative liberty.”163 
Professor Elizabeth Price Foley expresses a broader view of the 
parity between cloning and other assisted reproductive technologies.  
Simply put, Foley posits that “[b]ecause cloning is merely an asexual 
form of procreation, it is arguably as much a fundamental 
constitutional right as our right to procreate by either passion or the 
petri dish.”164  In a recent article, Foley critiques Robertson’s view that 
procreational liberty should lie only where the gestational or 
biological actors possess an intent to rear the resulting child.165  Foley 
draws an analogy to traditional adoption scenarios where the 
pregnant woman and biological father agree to surrender the child 
upon birth.166  Such a decision would not then terminate the 
procreational liberty of either the gestating “bearer” or the 
genetically-related “begetter.”167  For example, if the woman chose to 
terminate her pregnancy, she could exercise that reproductive liberty 
within the bounds of prevailing state law.  Foley argues that just as 
intent is irrelevant to the application of reproductive freedoms in 
coital conception, neither should it play a role in according rights 
when cloning techniques are used to conceive a child.168  In poignant 
language, she argues that “unless we are prepared to institute ‘mind 
police’ to enforce the appropriate moral or ethical standards for 
conceiving a child, there is no place in the law of procreational 
liberty for distinctions based upon the often inchoate and 
questionable motivations of parents.”169  The view that cloning is 
simply an additional reproductive option in our growing arsenal of 
assisted technologies is linked logically with the assertion that a ban 
on cloning is a deprivation of reproductive liberty.170  Yet even this 
 
 163 Id. 
 164 Foley, supra note 127, at 695. 
 165 Id. at 702. 
 166 Id. at 702-03. 
 167 Id. at 703. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. at 704. 
 170 A finding that a cloning ban is a deprivation of reproductive liberties would 
not automatically invalidate such a law.  Instead, the court would use strict scrutiny to 
evaluate whether the government has a sufficiently compelling interest in stopping 
the practice.  As Professor Erwin Chemerinsky explains, “[u]nder strict scrutiny, a law 
will be upheld if it is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.  In other words, 
the court must regard the government’s purpose as vital, as ‘compelling.’  Also, the 
law must be shown to be ‘necessary’ as a means to accomplishing the end.  This 
requires proof that the law is the least restrictive or least discriminatory alternative.”  
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, at 416 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).  When 
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foundational point, that cloning is a form of reproduction, is highly 
disputed.  A prominent voice among those who find cloning 
distinguishable from other ARTs is Professor Lori Andrews.  She 
argues that “cloning is too qualitatively different from normal 
reproduction and from the types of assisted reproduction protected 
by the . . . case [law] to simply assume that the same Constitutional 
protections apply.”171  Cloning, she argues, “is not a process of genetic 
mix, but of genetic duplication,” which is sufficiently different from 
reproduction in which a unique genotype is formed.172  George Annas 
joins Andrews in her views and warns that “[t]his change in kind in 
the fundamental way in which humans can ‘reproduce’ represents 
such a challenge to human dignity and the potential devaluation of 
human life . . . that even the search for an analogy has come up 
empty handed.”173 
Proponents of a ban on reproductive cloning will likely respond 
to a constitutional challenge based on procreative liberty with the 
assertion that cloning is distinguishable from other forms of 
reproduction sufficient to justify its exclusion from the protected 
realm of conduct that constitutes our reproductive freedom.  Those 
distinguishing characteristics might include the fact that cloning is an 
asexual form of reproduction, meaning that it does not require the 
sexual union of sperm and egg to begin the process of cell division.174  
All other known forms of reproduction, including currently 
employed ARTs, such as artificial insemination and in vitro 
fertilization, are forms of sexual reproduction because they rely on 
the joining of the egg and sperm.175  Cloning may be further 
distinguished because it results in a child whose genotype matches 
that of an existing person.  Other forms of reproduction result in a 
 
strict scrutiny is applied, laws are generally declared unconstitutional.  Id.  Whether a 
cloning ban would warrant and then survive strict scrutiny remains to be seen, but at 
least one scholar speculates on the various state interests that would be raised in a 
cloning ban challenge.  See Foley, supra note 127, at 709-30 (including the 
preservation of the traditional family, the protection of personal autonomy and 
privacy, the preservation of the sanctity of human life, the protection of the health 
and safety of human embryos, and the preservation of human genetic diversity). 
 171 Andrews, supra note 127, at 666. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Scientific Discoveries in Cloning: Challenges for Public Policy: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On Public Health and Safety of the Senate Comm. On Labor and Human Resources, 
105th Cong. 44 (1997) (statement of George Annas), as cited in Andrews, supra note 
127, at 666. 
 174 See Thomas W. Hilgers, The New Technologies of Birth and Death, in THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES OF BIRTH AND DEATH: MEDICAL, LEGAL AND MORAL DIMENSIONS 29, 46-
47 (1980). 
 175 See Foley, supra note 127, at 652 n.29. 
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mixed, unique genotype.  Perhaps cloning will be separated out 
because it is the only known form of reproduction that does not 
require the involvement of a male.  Perhaps for these and other 
reasons, those who would exclude cloning from the ambit of 
protected reproductive freedoms are making an implicit assertion 
that the “differentness” of cloning is normatively a negative quality. 
I have previously observed that the initial overwhelmingly 
negative reactions to cloning are reminiscent of furors that encircled 
prior advances in reproductive medicine.176  Two modalities in 
particular, artificial insemination by donor (AID) and in vitro 
fertilization (IVF), faced intense public skepticism and anxiety when 
first introduced.  Like their successor cloning technology, AID and 
IVF stirred up dire warnings about the victimization of children and 
the doomed fate of mankind should such unnatural methods of 
reproduction be embraced.177  When AID was introduced in the 
1950s,178 critics called it “nothing more than mechanical adultery” 
injurious to the essential nature and structure of the family.179  The 
introduction of IVF in the 1970s was likewise condemned as immoral, 
with one scholar proposing that “technological reproduction” should 
never be used to supplant human procreation.180  Today both 
methods of noncoital reproduction enjoy considerable favor, 
combining to account for the birth of over 60,000 children 
annually.181 
Whether cloning will achieve the technical and social successes 
now enjoyed by once-condemned reproductive technologies remains 
to be seen, but one similarity is already apparent.  Cloning is, at its 
very core, a method of human reproduction.  To reproduce, or 
 
 176 See Daar, supra note 57, at 171. 
 177 See id. at 169-82. 
 178 The history of AID, which actually dates back to the late 1800s, is described in 
Daar, supra note 57, at 169-70. 
 179 See Alberty R. Jonsen, Reproduction and Rationality, 4 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE 
ETHICS 263 (1995). 
 180 See Paul Ramsey, Shall We Reproduce”?, 220 JAMA 1346 (1972). 
 181 See Machelle M. Seibel, Therapeutic Donor Insemination, in FAMILY BUILDING 
THROUGH EGG AND SPERM DONATION 34 (Machelle M. Seibel & Susan L. Crockin 
eds.,1996) (reporting AID accounts for nearly 30,000 births annually); see also Society 
for Assisted Reproductive Technology and the American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine, Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United States: 1998 Results Generated 
From the American Society for Reproductive Medicine/ Society for Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Registry, 77 FERTILITY & STERILITY 18 (2002) (reporting the birth of 29,128 
neonates through the use of IVF and other similar reproductive technologies).  In 
fact, the number of children born worldwide through IVF is much higher because 
the ASRM statistics only include clinics in the United States. 
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“produce again or anew”182 is, and will remain, a mystery of the 
human condition, with the vast majority opting for the method of 
least resistance.  Common sense dictates that the leading choice for 
reproduction will be the old-fashioned way, followed in turn by 
methods that involve the least time, money, and effort.  Cloning may 
soon join the rank of available reproductive technologies, but it will 
be a rare couple or individual who opts for what will undoubtedly be 
a highly expensive, initially highly experimental treatment.  Cloning 
will serve as a treatment of last resort when all other therapies have 
failed or cannot guard against heritable genetic defects.  And for 
those individuals who turn to cloning to replace a lost child, let us 
remember that in the end, cloning produces a child.  One’s capacity 
to love and cherish that child will be no more affected by genotype 
than it is by the many other qualities that the child brings to life. 
From a procreative liberty perspective, once cloning is proven 
safe and effective, there seems to be no compelling reason to exclude 
this process from the ranks of other forms of protected reproductive 
activities.  Couples and individuals who seek out cloning will be a rare 
breed, many of whom will have suffered the pain of intractable 
infertility or worse, the loss of a child.  To deny these individuals, or 
even individuals who choose to reproduce through cloning for 
reasons that appear idiosyncratic but are deeply rooted, can only 
serve to empower the government to make lifestyle choices for society 
that today seem beyond the realm of contemplation.  Deprivation of 
the right to reproduce in a manner one chooses strikes at the heart of 
the liberty interest. 
2.  Is a Total Ban On Human Cloning Unconstitutionally 
Vague? 
A federal or state statute that bans human cloning may be 
subject to challenge as unconstitutionally vague.  A law that is vague, 
especially but not exclusively a criminal law, violates the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in three ways.  First, a vague 
law fails to give adequate notice of prohibited conduct.183  Without 
such notice, it is impossible for individuals to regulate their conduct 
within legal bounds.184  Courts often summarize this prong of the 
 
 182 “Reproduce” is defined as “to produce again  anew . . . or . . . to bear 
offspring.”  WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1140 (1986). 
 183 Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1364 (N.D. Ill. 1990), aff’d mem., 914 
F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 n.8 (1974)). 
 184 Id.  Due Process guarantees individuals the right to fair notice of whether their 
conduct is prohibited by law.  Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-91, 399 (1979) 
(citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)).  Although only 
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vagueness standard by admonishing that “a statute is void for 
vagueness if persons of ‘common intelligence must necessarily guess 
at its meaning.’”185  Second, vague statutes invite arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement by police, judges, and juries.  Because a 
vague law fails to define explicitly what conduct is unlawful, its 
enforcers and interpreters may pursue their personal predilections in 
finding a violation, rather than adhering to an objective standard.186  
Third, vague standards of unlawful conduct inevitably cause people 
to overestimate the range of prohibited conduct, thus inhibiting 
lawful, and even constitutionally protected, conduct.187 
A statutory ban on cloning may be challenged as impermissibly 
vague by those individuals whose conduct would be affected or 
proscribed by the statute.  Potential plaintiffs might include 
researchers, physicians, or even patients who may fall within the 
parameters of the statutory language.188  A court’s review of any 
vagueness challenge will inevitably require close review of the 
statutory language, and in some instances may include reference to 
the legislative history surrounding the enactment.189  A law which 
imposes civil penalties for the proscribed conduct may be found 
unconstitutionally vague.190  In the case of a criminal statute, 
vagueness review is even more exacting than in the civil context.191 
 
constructive rather than actual notice is required, individuals must be given a 
reasonable opportunity to discern whether their conduct is proscribed so they can 
choose whether or not to comply with the law.  Forbes v. Napolitano, 236 F.3d 1009, 
1011 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966)). 
 185 Planned Parenthood v. Arizona, 718 F.2d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 186 Id. (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974) (commenting that 
statutory language of “standardless sweep allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries 
to pursue their personal predilections.  Legislatures may not so abdicate their 
responsibilities for setting the standard of the criminal law”)). 
 187 Id. (citing Colautti, 439 U.S. at 391) (holding unconstitutionally vague an 
abortion law requiring persons performing abortions to preserve life of fetus if it 
could be determined that the fetus “is viable or if there is sufficient reason to believe 
that the fetus may be viable . . . .”). 
 188 For example, in Forbes v. Napolitano, 236 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2000) plaintiff 
patients challenged an Arizona abortion law which they contended preventing them 
from obtaining fetal tissue transplantation, considered by some a life-saving medical 
treatment for Parkinson’s Disease. 
 189 See, e.g., Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1369 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (quoting 
extensively from the legislative history surrounding the Illinois Abortion Law in a 
vagueness challenge by a class of physicians). 
 190 For example, in Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., the 
Court analyized a law that imposed only a fine between $10 and $500.  455 U.S. 489, 
492.  The Court, however, determined that this law survived a challenge because it 
did not unreasonably limit protected conduct.  Id. at 495. 
 191 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (holding that penal statutes 
must define criminal offenses with “sufficient definiteness,” and “in a manner that 
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To date, seven states have enacted statutory cloning bans, 
including: Arkansas,192 California,193 Louisiana,194 Michigan,195 
Missouri,196 Rhode Island,197 and Virginia.198  All six statutes provide 
civil penalties for engaging in human cloning, ranging in severity 
from $50,000 “for each incident,”199 to $10,000,000 for any attempt to 
engage in human cloning.200  In addition, the state of Louisiana 
imposes criminal penalties on any person who “clone[s] or 
attempt[s] to clone a human being.”201  The crime of cloning in 
Louisiana is punishable by civil fine of not more than ten million 
dollars; imprisonment, for not more than ten years; or both.202  
Because Louisiana is the only state currently imposing criminal 
penalties for cloning activities, it may be instructive to evaluate the 
viability of a vagueness challenge to Louisiana’s cloning ban.203 
As a threshold inquiry, a wide range of plaintiffs may have 
standing to challenge Louisiana’s cloning ban on vagueness grounds.  
The statute provides that “[n]o person shall clone or attempt to clone 
a human being.”204  Under the statute, a “person” include a 
researcher who develops a cloning technique, a physician who 
employs such technique on behalf of a patient, and even the patient 
who consents to participate in the cloning activities by providing the 
somatic cell to be used for transfer.  A person who initiates the 
cloning process by enlisting the services of one or more skilled 
clonists may under the broad statutory language have attempted to 
clone a human being.  Read liberally, an “attempt” under the statute 
may not require the medical know-how to actually achieve the desired 
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results, but simply the intent to bring about the birth of a child via 
cloning. 
The terms used to describe the prohibited conduct may also 
present a vagueness concern.  The relevant portions of the law 
provide: 
A. No person shall clone or attempt to clone a human being. 
B. No person shall purchase or sell an ovum, zygote, embryo, or 
fetus with the intent to clone a human being. 
C. This Section does not prohibit scientific research or a cell 
based therapy not specifically prohibited elsewhere by this Part.205 
The definition of cloning set forth in the statute also raises further 
vagueness questions: 
As used in this Part, “clone” means the practice of creating or 
attempting to create a human being by transferring the nucleus 
from a human cell from whatever source into a human egg cell 
from which the nucleus has been removed for the purpose of or 
to implant the resulting product to initiate a pregnancy that could 
result in the birth of a human being.206 
Read together, these sections of the Louisiana cloning ban are 
arguably both underinclusive and overinclusive in their descriptions 
of prohibited conduct, thus leaving “persons of common intelligence 
. . . forced to guess as to whether or not their conduct is unlawful.”207 
The described conduct is underinclusive because it does not 
encompass all of the methods through which human cloning may be 
achieved.  The statute defines cloning as “transferring the nucleus 
from a human cell . . . into a human egg from which the nucleus has 
been removed . . . .”208  Two scenarios currently under development 
would clearly fall outside of this definition.  First, researchers have 
achieved promising results using cow eggs as hosts for human DNA.209  
A researcher who transfers the nucleus from a human cell into a cow 
egg cell in this manner would not be guilty under the statute, even 
though her intent would be to create a child using SCNT.  Second, 
researchers in China have been experimenting with a technique that 
adds the somatic cell nucleus into an egg from which the nucleus has 
not been removed.  Preliminary results show that removing the 
original nucleus after the somatic cell nucleus has been inserted is a 
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superior technique that improves the early embryo’s chance of 
survival.210  Under the strict construction required of a criminal 
statute, researchers adopting the Chinese method of cloning may 
reasonably believe that their conduct is not unlawful because the law 
prohibits only the transfer of a nucleus to an enucleated cell.  
Although a survey of Louisiana legislators might reveal that the law 
was intended to cover the Chinese method, the effect of the statute’s 
underinclusive language cannot be denied.211 
Perhaps a graver infirmity of the Louisiana cloning ban is its 
potential to inhibit lawful conduct by failing to define clearly  
“scientific research or a cell based therapy,” activities which are 
exempt under the act.  The failure to define a referenced activity, 
even one that is specifically exempt from prosecution, often renders a 
statute overbroad and thus impermissibly vague.212  For example, in 
Forbes v. Napolitano,213 plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of an 
Arizona statute that criminalized any medical “experimentation” or 
“investigation” involving fetal tissue from induced abortions, unless 
necessary to perform a “routine pathological examination” or to 
diagnose a maternal or fetal condition that prompted the abortion.214  
The plaintiffs in Forbes included physicians who wished to provide 
fetal tissue transplantation to patients suffering from Parkinson’s 
Disease.215  The court reviewed the language in the statute, noting the 
dearth of definitions of key terms, including “experimentation,” 
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“investigation,” and “routine,” and concluded that the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague because it provided no guidance to 
physicians as to what conduct would be prohibited and what would be 
exempt.216  Without defining its terms, the statute exempted “routine 
examination” of fetal tissue, while prohibiting “experimentation” 
thereon, thus giving doctors inadequate notice as to what conduct 
would be actionable.217  A doctor may undertake a procedure that she 
views as routine, but the state might consider such a procedure illegal 
under the statute.  Likewise, a physician may refrain from 
undertaking a particular procedure for fear that he will be arrested 
for engaging in experimentation.  Statutes drafted in this manner 
are, thus, under- and overinclusive and therefore unconstitutionally 
vague. 
Though the cloning statutes in general, and the Louisiana 
statute in particular, are careful to define the key term of “cloning,” 
several statutes are remiss in providing a definition of “scientific 
research.”  In addition to Louisiana, Michigan,218 and Virginia219 also 
explicitly exempt scientific research but provide little guidance as to 
what such conduct entails.220  One concern about the exemption of 
scientific research is that scientists may be inhibited from pursuing 
cell-based experimentation for fear of prosecution or imposition of 
civil fines.  The exemption of “research” from the cloning bans is 
designed to allow and perhaps even encourage therapeutic cloning, a 
technique that does not result in the birth of a human being.  In fact, 
however, these statutes may have the effect of inhibiting rather than 
encouraging the study of therapeutic cloning. 
For example, if a researcher studies therapeutic cloning and 
discovers that the cloned embryo produces viable stem cells only after 
it is implanted in a woman’s uterus for some time period and then 
removed, this form of scientific research would be prohibited in 
Louisiana because such implantation “could result in the birth of a 
human being.”  While a researcher’s intent would not be the birth of 
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a child, the relevant conduct could subject the individual to 
prosecution because the statute does not explicate a scienter 
requirement.  This suggests an anomalous result: conduct alone, 
regardless of intent, could subject researchers to criminal liability.  
Consequently, this would likely chill research that is explicitly 
exempted by the statute. 
A similar infirmity befell the Illinois abortion law in Lifchez v. 
Hartigan.221  The statute provided in relevant part, “[n]o person shall 
sell or experiment upon a fetus produced by the fertilization of a 
human ovum by a human sperm unless such experimentation is 
therapeutic to the fetus thereby produced. . . .  Nothing in subsection 
(7) is intended to prohibit the performance of in vitro fertilization.”222  
Physicians practicing in the area of reproductive medicine challenged 
the law as unconstitutionally vague because it failed to define key 
terms such as “experimentation” and “therapeutic.”223  One of the 
plaintiffs, Dr. Lifchez, argued that the absence of clear guidance from 
the legislature as to the meaning of these significant terms left him 
uncertain about the lawfulness of his work using IVF.224  Even though 
the statute exempts “the performance of in vitro fertilization,” there 
are several related techniques, such as embryo transfer and genetic 
screening of IVF-derived embryos, that are not explicitly exempt 
under the statute and might have subjected Dr. Lifchez and others to 
liability.225  Moreover, Dr. Lifchez worried that if he tried to improve 
upon current IVF techniques, even these subtle changes would be 
undertaken “at his peril.”226  Any variation of the IVF technique may 
be therapeutic to the woman trying to conceive, but it is decidedly 
non-therapeutic to embryos that might be lost in the initial stages of 
experimentation.  Thus, even though the statute exempted IVF from 
prosecution, it left uncertainty as to how the technique could be 
undertaken. 
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The Lifchez court agreed that the failure to define key terms 
rendered the statute impermissibly vague because it subjected 
physicians to uncertainty and possible criminal liability for engaging 
in seemingly protected conduct.227  As noted above, experimentation 
with therapeutic cloning may obtain a similar result.  The exemption 
for “scientific research or cell-based therapies” in several states’ 
cloning bans may present vagueness problems because the statutes 
fail to explain the meaning of any of these key terms.  Researchers 
who clone embryos for the purpose of scientific inquiry may find 
their futures uncertain if their conduct appears to creep toward 
reproduction, even if their intent lies firmly in purely therapeutic 
territory.  This uncertainty has traditionally formed the basis for 
declaring a law unconstitutionally vague and no compelling reason 
emerges to deny cloning bans equal treatment under the law. 
Although the current state bans on human cloning seem ripe for 
constitutional challenge, the chances that such challenges will be 
upheld are admittedly slim.  As to procreative liberty arguments, 
courts are likely to find that cloning is not within the realm of 
protected reproductive activities.  Even if courts are willing to reach 
that far, there are sufficiently compelling state interests in banning 
the practice, at least until such time as issues of safety and efficacy are 
satisfactorily resolved.  As to vagueness concerns, courts may find 
little or no ambiguity in the prohibitory language, particularly when 
the statutes impose civil rather than criminal penalties.  Thus, with 
enacted cloning bans predicted to survive and grow in number, it is 
unlikely that human cloning will not make its way to the shores of our 
nation.  The following section assesses the practical aspects of 
banning a technology that is snowballing its way into the hearts and 
minds of scientists worldwide. 
C.  Is a Ban on Human Cloning Practical? 
Human cloning as a practical matter is probably best described 
as a “genie out of the bottle” problem.  Human curiosity will continue 
to pursue a deeper understanding of human biology and scientists 
will continue to seek mastery over human processes that at one time 
seemed exclusively within nature’s domain.  We need only reflect on 
advances in the artificial heart, the field of organ transplantation and, 
of course, the burgeoning world of ARTs to see that science 
continues to overcome nature’s barriers in the name of human 
longevity and well-being.  Cloning stirs those same intellectual 
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curiosities, and in fact  has done so for much of the last century.  
Experimentation in the field of animal cloning dates back to the 
1930s, when researchers attempted to clone a vertebrate.228  Cloning 
efforts in the 1950s and 1960s focused on amphibia, and attempts at 
cloning mammals began in the late 1970s.229  For cloning researchers, 
the announcement of Dolly’s birth was less a surprise than a 
confirmation that their collective efforts had yielded a tentative 
answer—mammalian cloning is possible. 
With this natural and long-standing inquiry into cloning, will a 
ban stop all current and future attempts to clone a human being?  If 
not, what are the implications of enacting statewide, national, or even 
global cloning bans?  Bans on cloning can and do take a variety of 
forms, from bans on any attempt to create a human embryo using 
SCNT regardless of the intended use of such an embryo,230 to bans on 
governmental funding of efforts to clone a human being.231  The 
practical effect of any additional ban may be minimal, as research 
efforts are currently unfunded by the government and numerous 
jurisdictions have stringent cloning bans in place.  Yet we are keenly 
aware that cloning research and experimentation is underway.  To 
understand this defiant conduct, it is useful to review the various 
achievements that undergird the human cloning efforts. 
1.  Successes and Failures in Animal Cloning 
It may be that Dolly was the first mammal successfully conceived 
through cloning, but she is no longer alone in her class.  Recent 
reports indicate that scientists have succeeded in cloning rabbits, 
cattle, goats, mice, pigs, and cats, bringing the current total to seven 
animal species.232  Progress in the cloning of multiple animal species 
may seem a logical and necessary step in the march toward human 
cloning, but the results and reactions to animal cloning have stirred 
rather than quelled concerns over the prospect of human cloning.  In 
the six years since the announcement of Dolly’s birth, reports on the 
safety and efficacy of animal cloning have ranged from “the health of 
clones is no different than non-clones”233 to “every clone is genetically 
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and physically defective.”234  Finding the reality amid these vastly 
diverging reports is a challenge, one complicated by the fact that the 
science continues to evolve daily. 
The facts surrounding Dolly’s birth are now well-known.  Dolly 
was the only sheep to survive the 277 attempts at SCNT,235 which 
called into question the efficiency of cloning as a method of 
reproduction.236  In January 2002, it was reported that Dolly suffers 
from arthritis, a condition that is thought to be unusual for a sheep 
in her age group.237  Moreover, recent retrospective reports list 
defects occurring regularly in cloned animals, including gigantism 
(excessive size) in cloned sheep and cattle, placentas up to four times 
the normal size in mice, and heart defects in pigs.238  Researchers at 
the University of Cincinnati reported that cloned mice became obese 
after three weeks and grew to nearly three times larger than normal 
mice as they aged.239  Other experiments with cloned mice found 
damaged immune systems, spontaneous abortions, abnormal births, 
and premature deaths.240 
Researchers who report these clinical findings on cloned 
animals are generally unsure why these defects occur.  One theory 
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holds that cloned animals have shortened telomeres,241 the bits of 
genetic material at the tips of chromosomes that wear down each 
time a cell divides.242  Shorter than normal telomeres essentially 
means that cells start out older and may die off sooner, possibly 
translating into a shorter lifespan for the cloned animal.243  Other 
researchers speculate that cloning problems are due to inadequate or 
inappropriate “reprogramming” of genes during the process of 
injecting DNA into an enucleated egg.244  Still others believe that the 
cloning process can turn any gene on or off at random with an 
unpredictable and potentially devastating impact on the health of the 
cloned animal.245 
Reports of the dangers of animal cloning share the media stage 
with claims of success and progress in understanding and improving 
the science of cloning.  The sheer number of successfully cloned 
species indicates the rapid progress of animal cloning research.  To 
date, researchers have successfully cloned seven animal species, most 
recently cats and rabbits.246  In December 2001, California-based 
Genetic Savings & Clone teamed with researchers at Texas A & M 
University to clone a cat, appropriately named “cc” for “copycat.”247  
By all accounts, cc remains a normal, healthy cat.248  A few months 
after cc’s birth, French researchers announced the birth of healthy 
rabbit clones.249  The rabbits had been born a year earlier, but 
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researchers delayed announcing the births until the rabbits started to 
reproduce normally.250  In announcing the cloning achievement, 
researchers assured the public that “the animals were mature and 
their good health certain.”251 
In addition to claims of health for specific species, scientists have 
reported on the overall good health of cloned animals.  In a study 
published in the prestigious journal Science, researchers compared 
cloned cows to cows conceived through artificial insemination and 
found no difference in their health status.252  In addition, a recent 
survey of all cloned live-born animals concluded that the majority 
remains healthy.  Moreover, the survey found that the health of the 
natural offspring of cloned animals is no different from non-cloned 
animal offspring.253  Dolly herself became a mother in April 1998 
when she gave birth to Bonnie, a lamb conceived “the old-fashioned 
way” with a mountain ram named David.254  In 1999, Dolly gave birth 
again, this time to triplets, and in 2000 she bore twins, with no 
complications reported for any of these offspring.255  Today, Dolly 
joins roughly 5,000 other animals conceived through SCNT in the 
past six years.256 
With the number of cloned animals poised to multiply in the 
months and years ahead, legitimate queries are raised about animal 
cloning and its effect on human cloning.  Will success in the animal 
arena give implied authorization for researchers to apply their fund 
of knowledge to human reproduction?  Or will scientists search for 
more reliable assurances of the safety and efficacy of cloning as 
applied to human beings?  Though we have some knowledge about 
the degree to which experiments and procedures on animals 
translate to human outcomes, we will only know about the effects of 
SCNT when the first embryo, fetus, and child is created.  For some, 
the leap from animal experiments to human conception is far too 
grave a prospect to contemplate; for others, it is a necessary and 
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inevitable step in the advancement and development of humankind. 
To date, there have been few if any calls for banning 
reproductive cloning in animals.257  The merits and rationales for 
continuing to perfect the science of cloning in animals seem 
markedly different from those associated with human cloning.  
Reproductive cloning of the human species has been linked to 
narcissism and nefarious desires to engineer our children “to custom 
specifications.”258  But when performed on animals, cloning is seen as 
beneficial to humans.259  The benefits of animal cloning include the 
production of superior cattle for meat consumption,260 the 
revivification of a lost pet for lifetime companionship,261 and the 
creation of animals for use in medical research.262  With these 
significant benefits to mankind, it seems unlikely that efforts to learn 
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more about cloning through animal studies will be halted. 
Moreover, it seems equally unlikely that any ban on human 
reproductive cloning will affect research in the animal kingdom.  In 
fact, the call for a human cloning ban may flow directly from the 
ongoing progress in animal cloning.  Those opposed to human 
cloning because of safety and efficacy concerns may call for a 
temporary ban until full-fledged results from animal studies can be 
evaluated.  Policy groups such as the National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission and the National Academy of Sciences, which urged for 
a temporary moratorium to be placed on reproductive cloning, seem 
open to supporting the technique if they were convinced that 
children born of the process would be as healthy as children born 
from ordinary conception.  For these groups and others like them, 
animal cloning may be the gateway to human cloning.  Banning 
human cloning now may have the effect of accelerating research on 
animal cloning so that a sufficient number of species can be 
successfully cloned, including species closest to humans, to assuage 
safety concerns.  Thus, in the end, a ban on human cloning will not 
thwart efforts to clone multiple animal species and may ultimately 
enable the production of sufficient evidence to support moving 
forward with cloning human beings. 
2.  Inroads In Human Cloning 
The race to legislate national and even international bans on 
human reproductive cloning can be evaluated in terms of its practical 
effect on researchers and others anxious to garner a place in history 
for being the first to clone a human being.  Thus, the practical effects 
of banning human cloning should be considered either before or at 
the same time such bans are widely adopted.  If bans will have no 
effect in stopping attempts to clone a human being, what ancillary 
effects will they have?  If the net effect of such bans is negative or 
even neutral, can they be justified in light of the false sense of 
security they may invoke?  Human nature is such that bans on 
conduct can serve to incite curiosity, often leading to irresponsible 
conduct.  Should human cloning be the victim of such natural 
instincts, we must seriously question the value of an outright ban. 
As noted above, a number of U.S. states as well as numerous 
countries have already banned human reproductive cloning.263  Yet 
efforts to clone a human being are ongoing in the United States and 
abroad.  One of the earliest to announce cloning aspirations was Dr. 
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Severino Antinori, an Italian fertility specialist who promised in 
August 2001 that he would work to create the first cloned human 
being.264  In April 2002, Dr. Antinori surfaced again, this time amid 
rumors that he is responsible for the first ongoing pregnancy using a 
cloned embryo.265  The Gulf News, an English-language newspaper in 
the United Arab Emirates, reported that Dr. Antinori announced at a 
local conference that one woman in his fertility program was in the 
early stages of a cloned pregnancy.266  Later in the month, Dr. 
Antinori claimed that he was aware of, but not responsible for, three 
ongoing cloned pregnancies of babies in their ninth, seventh, and 
sixth weeks of gestation.267  Though the doctor claimed he was “not 
implicated in any way,”268 he did reveal the country of origin of the 
three women as two former Soviet states and one Islamic country.269  
He made this comment after remarking that China, India, Russia, 
and the Muslim countries are more favorable to the idea of human 
cloning than many other countries.270 
On December 26, 2002, it appeared that Dr. Antinori was 
upstaged by a group known as Clonaid, which announced the birth of 
the world’s first human clone.271  The baby, nicknamed Eve, was 
alleged to have been born outside the United States to American 
parents.272  Clonaid’s president, Brigitte Boisselier, offered no proof 
that the birth had occurred, raising skepticism among the scientific 
community.273  Clonaid continues to announce the birth of cloned 
babies,274 but to date has produced no evidence that such a task has 
 
 264 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Despite Opposition,Three Vow to Pursue Cloning of Humans, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2001, at A1. 
 265 See First Human Cloning Pregnancy Reported: Scientists Skeptical, TRANSPLANT NEWS, 
Apr. 12, 2002. 
 266 Id. 
 267 See Graham Diggines, Doctor Says Women Are Carrying Clones, EDINBURGH 
EVENING NEWS, Apr. 24, 2002, at 2.  Other scientists doubt the reports of multiple 
cloned pregnancies are true.  See Human Clone Race to Deliver in 2003, MX, May 16, 
2002, at 7. 
 268 Diggines, supra note 265, at 2. 
 269 Id. 
 270 Id. 
 271 Clonaid is a private company affiliated with the Raelian religious sect.  Raelians 
believe that space travelers created the human race by cloning.  Among other things, 
Raelians believe cloning is the path to eternal life, transferring memories and 
consciousness from one copy to the next.  See Dana Canedy & Kenneth Chang, Group 
Says Human Clone Was Born to an American, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2002, at A16. 
 272 Id. 
 273 See Gina Kolata, Experts Are Suspicious of Group’s Claim of Cloned Human’s Birth, 
N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 2002, at A16. 
 274 David Carr, Networks Say Former Editor Tried to Sell Clone “Exclusive”, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 5, 2003, at 14 (detailing Clonaid’s claims to have birthed two cloned babies). 
 566 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:511 
been accomplished.275  In an ironic twist, Dr. Antinori, the first doctor 
to make claims that he would accomplish human cloning, dismissed 
Clonaid’s claims, saying the group “has no credibility in the science 
community.”276  At the same time, Dr. Antinori maintains that a 
consortium of scientists with whom he is affiliated has created at least 
three pregnancies using cloning techniques.277  To date, no evidence 
of any human clone has been presented to the scientific community 
or to the public at large. 
We may eventually learn whether the rumors and attributions 
surrounding Clonaid and Dr. Antinori are in fact true if a healthy 
baby is born and the child’s genome is verified as an identical match 
to an existing person.  Importantly, we may not learn the details 
surrounding the birth of a cloned child if the infant suffers from any 
serious health problems or dies in the neonatal period.  Most 
probably, no matter what the outcome of these alleged initial 
pregnancies and births, inquiry into human cloning will continue.  
Clonaid and Dr. Antinori may be the only researchers now willing to 
air publicly their reproductive cloning efforts, but we can be sure that 
other attempts are underway. 
While no one in the United States has yet to claim a purposeful 
advancement of the science of human reproductive cloning, 
researchers at Advanced Cell Technologies (ACT), a biotechnology 
company based in Worcester, Massachusetts, have announced success 
at cloning human embryos.278  According to ACT, the experiments 
were conducted not for reproductive purposes, but to create a source 
of stem cells for therapeutic purposes.279  In November 2001, ACT 
published a study in the peer-reviewed on-line journal E-biomed 
detailing experiments with enucleated eggs and insertion of DNA 
from a donor cell.280  In the end, none of the eggs survived beyond 
the blastocyst stage and the possible blastocysts that did develop 
lacked the inner cell mass that yields stem cells.281  Despite the 
apparent lack of success in producing a viable human embryo, ACT’s 
actions were condemned for what they portended about the 
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possibility of human cloning in the future.282  Nevertheless, ACT 
vowed to continue its efforts to perfect human therapeutic cloning 
“as a potentially limitless source of immune-compatible cells for tissue 
engineering and transplantation medicine.”283 
In addition to the research efforts of American biotechnology 
companies such as ACT, studies are underway in other countries that 
certainly rival and perhaps surpass the work of U.S. scientists.  
Scientists at Xiangya Medical College in China claim to have cloned 
dozens of human embryos over the past two years for medical 
research purposes.284  These  researchers are said to be one of two 
teams of scientists in China currently working on embryo cloning 
experiments.285  Initial accounts reveal that the Chinese scientists have 
been able to grow a cloned embryo to the blastocyst stage, extract 
stem cells from the inner cell mass of the blastocyst, and maintain the 
stem cells in the laboratory for three generations.286  If this is the case, 
these researchers have far exceeded the reported capabilities of U.S. 
researchers.  Although the Chinese researchers emphasize that their 
work is aimed at therapeutic cloning, there is no scientific reason why 
the techniques being perfected could not also be used in 
reproductive cloning.  In a recent interview, Dr. Lu Guangxiu, the 
professor who heads the Xiangya team, was asked about the 
possibility of human reproductive cloning.  “It is,” she remarked, “an 
irresistible trend.”287 
This “irresistible trend” intrigues researchers not only because of 
its scientific newness, but also because of its potential for garnering 
enormous research dollars.  On the heels of Dr. Lu’s success, the 
Chinese government increased her annual research grant.288  In 
addition, she was able to convince one of China’s largest companies, 
China International Trust & Investment Corporation, to invest three 
million dollars in the fertility clinic she runs.289  Clearly, the 
opportunity for profit has propelled many countries into the cloning 
race.  Nations in Europe and Asia are creating regulatory 
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environments friendly to therapeutic cloning to attract both 
researchers and research funding.290  For example, lawmakers in 
Britain and Singapore recently revised their laws to allow stem cell 
research using human embryos.291  While the impetus for such 
reforms is clearly profit-oriented, the byproduct of such development 
will undoubtedly advance the science of human cloning.  Once 
scientists are adept at creating blastocysts using SCNT, the step 
toward implanting a cloned embryo into a woman’s uterus is a 
comparatively small measure. 
The recent and prospective future attention on manipulation of 
the human embryo for medical and research purposes has created a 
race for greater understanding of the science of cloning.  It is clear 
that researchers in the United States and abroad will continue their 
marathon efforts to clone human embryos, perhaps now for 
therapeutic purposes, but with a keen awareness of the reproductive 
possibilities lurking in the background.  A ban in any particular U.S. 
state will merely move operations across state lines; a ban in any 
particular country will likewise make other nations more friendly to 
the cloning community.  As described earlier, cloning is a “genie out 
of the bottle” phenomenon.  Ongoing experimentation both here 
and abroad is a predictable and natural response to an emerging 
technology that beckons mankind to unravel the mystery of human 
life. 
3.  The Effects of Banning Conduct 
The inevitability of human reproductive cloning may be in the 
minds of many scientists, but it is still perceived as a stoppable evil to 
many lawmakers.  Thus, the march toward a total ban on 
reproductive cloning continues, buoyed by the public’s revulsion to 
the very idea of cloning292 and the thoughtful comments of several 
prestigious panels that have recommended outlawing the practice.293  
If human reproductive cloning is banned in the United States, as it 
has been in most of Europe, we must ascertain what effect those laws 
will have on the practice of cloning.  A ban in the United States and 
Europe, or even a ban with more international scope, as has been 
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contemplated, seems unlikely to actually stop the science from being 
developed and the technique employed. 
The unprecedented step of banning a prospective scientific 
technique will not prevent the technology from being developed, but 
rather will negatively impact the way in which the development 
occurs.  Human nature is such that legislative bans do not always stop 
prohibited conduct; in fact, in some cases a ban may create an 
incentive for action.  Certainly our criminal justice system is replete 
with demonstrations of this principle.  Banning or criminalizing 
conduct has not made criminal acts extinct, and no doubt many a 
prisoner has earned that status by purposefully defying known 
prohibitions in the name of self-aggrandizement.  While the 
comparison between criminal acts and scientific inquiry may be a 
weak one, it nonetheless highlights the reality that when those in 
power declare certain conduct to be off limits for its citizenry, rarely 
if ever will such conduct cease in that society.  Even threats and 
demonstrations of severe penalties do not prevent displays of 
unwanted conduct.294 
In the cloning context, if Congress enacts a total ban, we should 
expect that ongoing efforts will move underground in the United 
States and offshore to more cloning-friendly nations.  Today, we are 
aware of a very small pool of researchers working openly in the area 
of embryo cloning, and all publicly state that their aims are strictly 
therapeutic.295  But we are also aware of hints at secret research being 
conducted on reproductive cloning.296  Those hints are coming from 
places outside the United States, but we are not immune from 
clandestine efforts at human cloning within our borders.  Last 
summer at a symposium sponsored by the National Academy of 
Sciences, Dr. Brigitte Boisselier, a chemist with Clonaid, announced 
that she had made progress toward human cloning.297  Though Dr. 
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Boisselier did not discuss the location of her research efforts, later 
reports revealed that she had been operating in a laboratory in Nitro, 
West Virginia.298  The “laboratory,” as it turns out, was a single 
classroom in the Nitro Community Center, a facility that also houses 
a day care center and the Nitro Police Department.299  The laboratory 
was shut down after agents of the  Food and Drug Administration 
began to investigate rumors of a cloning facility in Nitro.300 
What was perhaps most unsettling about Dr. Boisselier’s efforts 
was that they were supported by Mark Hunt, a lawyer and member of 
the state House of Delegates, who had paid the research group nearly 
$500,000 to clone his 10-month old son who died after surgery for a 
heart defect.301  Mr. Hunt’s grief over the loss of his son made him 
vulnerable to the promises of a single researcher, a researcher who 
lacked the background and support to fulfill even the most modest 
hopes of her sponsor.302  In the end, Mr. Hunt severed his ties with 
the cloning group because it was not making progress in the quest to 
create an identical twin of his lost son.303  Mr. Hunt is not alone in his 
private desire for the science of human cloning to come of age, nor is 
he likely to be the only victim of unscrupulous “researchers” who will 
continue to operate so long as they have a monopoly on those 
individuals and groups who wish to provide financial support to 
advance the cloning cause.  Such “researchers” will thrive until they 
are replaced by skilled professionals whose training and experience 
truly holds the promise of safe and ethical progress in this difficult 
area. 
Another byproduct of a ban on scientific research would be a  
“brain drain,” as talented and well-funded scientists leave the United 
States to establish research centers in nations with hospitable working 
environments.  We have already begun to see this brain drain to a 
small extent in the past year.304  In  2001, University of California 
researcher Roger Pedersen left his position at UC San Francisco to 
accept a post at Cambridge University in Britain.305  At the time of Dr. 
Pedersen’s move, Congress was debating the merits of banning all 
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forms of cloning research, including both reproductive and 
therapeutic techniques.306  At the same time, Britain was considering 
ways to create opportunities for researchers to flourish in the field of 
therapeutic cloning, seen as a biotechnology boon for all its promise 
of new and innovative therapies.307  When Dr. Pedersen made the 
move from the United States to Britain, it was widely reported that 
the impetus for his relocation was the differing state of the law in the 
two nations.308  Now, as Britain joins several other European and 
Asian countries vying for the hefty biotech dollars thought to be 
connected to therapeutic cloning and stem cell research, it is likely 
that the brain drain will only accelerate if Congress succeeds in 
banning all forms of cloning.309 
Banning conduct creates underground activities and banning 
cloning undoubtedly will have this expected result.  The few details 
we have learned about Dr. Boisselier’s activities should be all the 
warning we need.  Her cloning experiments, whether actual or 
threatened, would have taken place in a totally unsupervised, 
unregulated environment.  With underground cloning efforts, there 
will be no reporting to oversight organizations that could assess the 
safety, progress, or value of the experiments.  There will be no peer 
review of any findings that emerge from the research.  There will be 
no method to assure separation between the funding source for the 
research and the results of the research.  The opportunity for conflict 
of interest among these unchecked researchers is tremendous, and 
the probability that they will report false, perhaps even intentionally 
falsified data, is high. 
From a practical perspective, a ban on human cloning will only 
encourage development of irresponsible and ill-conceived research 
agendas.  A ban may provide an initial period of solace and comfort, 
but the curiosity surrounding cloning is too great to repress the 
exuberance that will accompany any perceived progress in the field, 
whether lawfully or unlawfully begotten.  The United States and a 
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number of other nations have long-standing research structures in 
place that could accommodate a steady and responsible path toward 
human reproductive cloning.  Working together in an open 
environment, the best and the brightest scientists of our age could 
advance our understanding of human development, an advance that 
will once again remind us how much more is yet to be discovered. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The prospect of human cloning poses the unanswerable query: 
will it improve nature or doom the species?  While the realities of a 
cloning-laden future are unknowable, we seem to have prejudged 
that future to be grim, besot with human misery by those who are the 
products of cloning and human indifference for those who 
reproduce in that fashion.  Today’s efforts to ban human cloning are 
emblematic of our own self-doubt, our fear that unraveling the 
mysteries of human life can only lead to our undoing.  Humanity has 
always displayed this schizophrenic view of itself, on the one hand 
pressing to know more about the world around us, while displaying 
initial fear and hostility toward the very things we seek to discover.  
Cloning is merely the latest discovery to evoke these instinctive and 
legitimate reactions. 
It is inevitable that advances in human cloning will far outpace 
our ability to halt the practice in any meaningful sense.  Statutory 
bans, such as those in place in the United States, are of questionable 
moral and legal status, but perhaps most importantly they are of little 
practical effect.  Rapid advances in animal cloning, coupled with 
renegade efforts to inaugurate the human cloning process, assure the 
viability of cloning as a future method of human reproduction.  
Reasoned regulation, not breakable barriers, seems a far better way to 
meet the challenges of a cloning future.  Human cloning will only 
doom our species if we fail to recognize the power it has to improve 
the human condition.  Harnessing that power is our challenge today 
because what we build will shape our future tomorrow and always. 
